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PREFACE 
The 1962 Drug Amendments caused a substantial change in the 
e.conomic character of the ethical pharmaceutical industry in the United 
States. It _is the purpose of this study to ascertain what impact these 
amendments have had upon the productivity of research and development in 
the drug industry. The methodology employed uses a multiple regression 
model which is analagous to a production function. Comparisons between 
this production functionand that of a similar production function for a 
period prior to the.1962 Drug Amendments aregiven as the primary 
evidence of this impact on R and D. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTlON 
In recent years the ethical pharmaceutical industry has become 
a subject of great social and economic concern. Its importance stems 
frout two basic sources, First, it .is an integral part of the broader 
health-care i~dustry which is of importance to all members of society. 
Secondly, the.ethical drug industry has been identified as a technolog-
ic•.l progressive industry, and thus it can be important in depicting 
,\\"\ 
what factors are necessary for technological advancement in the United 
States economy. 
The present. study deals with some of.· the economic aspects of 
technolagical change in the.ethical pharmaceutical industry. Specif-
ically,· it deals with the particular institutionaJ,. setting of the 
industry as it is established by the regulatory framework of the Food 
and Drug Administration, and what economic impact a change in this 
setting has had upon the research and development activity of the 
industry. The 1962 Drug Amendments represent a major change in the 
institutional setttng of the industry, and the impact of this 
legislation is analyzed. 
The significance of the 1962 Drug Amendments to the institutional 
framework·of the U. S. ethical drug industry is apparent for several 
.. ' 
reasons. 
1 
(1) These amendments represent the first major change in United 
States drug law since the passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act. 1 ' 2 
(2) The amendm~nts charged the Food and Drug Administration with 
the responsibility of close regulation of all the stages of the testing 
of new drugs. Special emphasis was placed on the scrutiny of the test-
2 
ing of new drugs in clinical trials. This is the testing stage in which 
new drugs are extensively evaluated in humans. The increased reporting 
and evaluating procedures required for the testing of new drugs were 
intended to increase the safety of these products. 
(3) The 1962 Drug Amendments also gave the FDA the responsibility 
of requiring the proof of efficacy of new drugs. Prior to the amend-
ments only proof of safety was required, but with the amendments the 
stated effectiveness of new drugs must be substantiated. This was 
implemented by.requiring formal evaluating and reporting procedures. 
(4) With the increased regulation of the .research and development 
activity of the industry, it appears that the costs of this R and D have 
been significantly increased. The increased evaluating and reporting 
procedures appear to be the primary cause of these increased costs. 
Two time periods are being used to assess the effects of the 
changes in the institutional setting. The first is a time period prior 
to the 1962 Drug Amendments--1955 to 1960. This.is a time period in 
1 52 Stat. at L. 1040 (1938). 
2 Joseph M. Jadlow, Jr., "The Economic Effects of the 1962 Drug 
Amendments, 11 (Unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, August, 
1970)' p. 1. 
3 
which the drug industry has been previously studied by William S. 
3 Comanor, and.it will serve as a reference point for CQmparing the post-
1962 period. The secondtime peried is 1965 to 1970; it was.selected 
with the view that the full effects of these amendments would -~ evident 
by this period. 
Four hypotheses are presented for analysis in this study. First, 
however, it will be determined whether a regression model analagous to a 
I productio~ function can usefulltexplain the Rand D activity of the drug 
industry. This model has new drug products as its dependent output 
variable and R and D inputs, size of firm, the interaction between the 
size of firm and the scale of research effort, and diversification as 
the independent variables. 
Hypothesis 1, which is the primary hypothesis of the study, deals 
with the productivity of professional research and development personnel 
in the drug industry. It is expected that the amendments have had a 
severe negative impact·on the additional output that can be.obtained 
by adding one more professional researcher. 
Prior to the amendments Comanor found this marginal relationship 
between professional R and D inputs and new drug output to be positive 
4 
up to a size of firm that was very large. It is hypothesized that the 
increased regulatory procedures required by the amendments have caused 
this relationship to become negative for all sizes of firms. 
·. 
3William S. Col,llanor, "Research and Technical Change in the Pharm-
aceutical Industry," Review of Economics and Statistics, 47 (May, 1965), 
pp. 182-190. 
4 Ibid., p. 185. 
4 
Hypothesis 2 deals with the impact of the 1962 Drug Amendments on 
economies of scale in doing durg R and D. As economists use the term, 
economies of scale usually concern the production processes of the firm 
where a proportionate increase in each of the productive inputs results 
in a mO't'e than prepor~-~onat;e inc;rease in the output of the firm. 
In this study only one aspect of the firm will be considered--its 
R and D activity--and the term economies of scale will only apply to 
this aspect. A direct measure of R and D scale economies is not pos-
sible because data on the magnitude of all R and D factor inputs is not 
available. Economies of scale will be looked at by observing the effect 
on R and D output of the relationship between the size of the firm and 
the level of its R and D labor inputs. It is expected that since the 
passage of the amendments there is a positive effect on the R and D out..,. 
put of the firm as both its size and its scale of R and D increases. 
This is due to the increased regulatory proce4ures which co~ld make the 
use of specialization of labor, high speed computers and specialized 
equipment more conducive to the production of new drugs. For the 1955-
1960 period Comanor found this relationship to be negative. 5 
Comanor.investigated "economies of scale" by observing the 
percentage increase in output that is achieved.when Rand D labor inputs 
are increased by one percent. If the percentage change in output was 
greater than one percent, he concluded that this indicated economies of 
scale. 6 For the of this study, it is felt that.this is purposes an 
5 •< 
,J:'Qad., p. 185. 
6 Ibid., pp. 187-188. 
5 
incorrect measure of scale economies. It is more precisely the output 
elasticity of one input. Scale economies relate to all available 
inputs. 
Hypothesis 3 concerns the type of scale economies that have been 
experienced since the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments, and states 
that supporting ~ and D personnel now contribute positively to the R and 
D output of the firm. Comanor.found the reverse of this to be true for 
7 the 1955-1960 time period. This result is expected because the 
increased reporting and record keeping necessitates greater use of this 
type of research and development personnel. 
Hypothesis 4 states that the effects of the 1962 Drug Amendments 
h~ve been so great that they have altered the input-output relation of 
the industry. Not only may the R and D output of the industry be 
determined in the manner of the original model, but it may be that the 
R and D output of the industry determines the level of research and 
development inpu~s. This result is anticipated because the firms 
~·'-
introducing new products ~l:'.e R and D intensive and this emphasizes their 
R and D competitiveness. This competitiveness feeds upon itself such 
that their R and D effort produces new products which enhances their 
profitability which in turn allows them to reinvest funds back into 
their R and D process. Comanor found this not to be the case for the 
8 period prior to the amendments. 
Each of these hypotheses is investigated using a simple multiple 
regression technique based on the model discussed above. In order to 
7 Ibid., pp. 188-189. 
8 Ibid., p. 189. 
make as reliable comparisons between the two periods as possible, the 
techniques and data sources of Comanor's original study are duplicated 
as closely as possible. 
6 
In addition to this introductory chapter~ the study is organized 
into five chapters. Chapter II presents a description of ,the basic 
industrial organization framework of the study as well as a description 
of the ethical pharmaceutical industry and its research and development 
characteristics •. Chapter III summarizes those aspects of the 1962 Drug 
Amendments tqat might have an ef~ect on the industry's Rand D, presents 
the hypotheses as to these effects, and gives a brief summary of the 
previous literature on the ,economic impact of the amendments on drug R 
and D. Chapter IV describes the methodology and data sources and 
characteristics of the present study. Chapter V presents the empirical 
results of :the study, and Chapter VI summarizes the conclusions of the 
study. 
CHAPTER II 
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE DRUG INDUSTRY 
AND ITS R AND D ACTIVITY 
The present chapter presents a discussion of the industrial 
organization framework which forms the basis for the present .study of 
the ethical pharmaceutical industry. The chapter also focuses on the 
economic aspects of the ethical drug industry--its structure, conduct, 
and performance. Finally, there is a discussion of the research and 
development activity of the drug industry. 
Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization, 
and Research Development 
One of the important conc~rns of economists about the purely 
competitive model is whether this market structure results in the incen-
tives that will induce a high rate of technological progress. Techno-
logical progress occurs on two fronts. First, there are some firms that 
are able to lower the cqsts of producing existing products. They 
1 provide the process innovations in an industry. Some economists state 
that one of the benefits that can be expected from pure competit~on 
concerns this type of technological innovation: 
: ,'Hi;· -
1werner .:z. Hirsch, "Technological Progress and Microeconomic 
Theery," American Ecenomic Review, LIX (May, 1969), p. 36. 
7 
Because of the pressure of prices on costs, entrepreneurs may 
have especially strong incentives to seek and adopt cost-
saving technological innovations. Indeed; if industry capac-
ity is correctly geared to demand at all times, the only way 
competitive firms can earn positive economic profits is 
through leadership in innovation. We might expect therefore 
that -technological pragress will be more rap'id in competitive 
industries.2 
Secondly, there is the technalogical progress by those firms that. 
3 produce new or impraved.prod~cts. This type of innovation is not 
eaSily adapted to the theory af the firm as it re],ates to pure competi-
tion. The essence of this.type of innovation is that it deals with the 
8 
demand for products. A new demand is being created thus the traditional 
theory ef-the firm does not adequately handle this. It is this type of 
innovation that occurs ~n the drug industry and this aspect of the_ 
industry is dealt with more fqlly in subsequent sections. 
There has been a great deal of discussion both on !!:. priori and an 
an empirical basis as-to what _type.af market structure is most conducive 
to technological change. As has already been mentioned, there are those 
who feel that a structure of pure competition maximizes the .rate of 
technological change. At the other extremes there are those who feel 
that_it is necessary to have monapoly power in order for technological 
change to occur. This issue is still being explored and no conclusive 
statements as to which view is valid can be made. 
2 F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance (Chicago, 1970); p. 13. 
3 Hirsch, p. 36. 
4This vi_ew has -become ta be -known as the Schumpeterian hypothesis 
as-first_expressed by J. A. Schumpeter~ Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy (New York, 1942) and m<ilre recently elaborated by John K. 
Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept .of Countervailing Power 
(Cambridge, _ 1952). -- -
9 
· The theeretical medel of pure competiti0n serves as a reference 
point for the empirical sub-.cliscipline ef industrial organization. In 
order to make this model pragmatic, the c0ncept ef workable campetitien 
has been develeped in the analysis ef industries. This concept farms 
the basis.af the industrial organization fraiµework. 5 
The industrial erganizatien methed ef analysis has been cbaracter-
ized by F •. M. Scherer in the following manner: 
In the field of industrial 0rganizati9n, we try ta determine 
how market precesses direct the activities ef producers.in 
meeting censumer demands, how these precesses may break dewn, 
and how they can be adjusted (i.e., threugh gevernment 
intervention) te make actual perfermance c0nf0rm more clesely 
to the ideal. 6 
This method ef analysis is divided inte three aspects that are net 
mutually exclusive. These aspects ef.an industry are its structure, 
conduct, and performance. The cencepts ef workable competition attempt 
to establish norms for these aspects and empirical tests are then 
relat~d to these narms. 7 
This study utilizes the basic industrial 0rganizati0n framewerk.in 
dealing with the ethical pharmaceutical industry. The primary emphasis 
ef th~ ~tudy deals with the market performance aspect of ec0n0mic 
pragressiveness--the drug industry's research and innavation. The 
5 For a camplete discussion of the various appreaches to warkable 
competitian, see Stephen H. Sasnick, "A Critique af Cencepts af Workable 
Campetitien," Quarterly Journal. ef Eccmemics, LXXII (August, 1958), pp. 
386-387. 
6 Scherer, p. 2. 
7 Representative summaries ef the industrial erganizatien framewerk 
and its method of analysis are pr0vided in Richard Caves, American 
Industry: Structure, Conduct, Perf0rmance (Englew00d Cliffs, New 
Jersey~ 1967), pp: 16-54 and pp. 96-114 and Scherer, pp. i·..,.7. 
10 
conduct features of this research and innovation are discussed also. An 
understanding of the research and development activity of the drug 
industry is very important because the firms in this industry have been 
8 identified as being very technologically progressive. This understand~ 
ing JD4ybe helpful in establishing valid models of the firm for these 
progressive firms. 
Drug Industry--Its Structure, 
Conduct, and Performance 
Since the early 1960's there have been several studies published 
which concern the structure, conduct, and performance of the ethical 
drug industry. The next four sections of this chapter deal with these 
issues. 
EShical Pharmaceutical Industry Defirted 
This study concentrates on the research and development activities 
in the ethical pharmaceutical industry. The industry has been iden-
tified in the following manner: 
The ethical drug industry incl~des firms primarily engaged in 
the fabrication, finishing; 0r sale of drug products or 
preparations ~n finished dosage forms such as pills, capsules, 
tablets, etc. 
The industxy is. known as the ·ethical drug industry bec.ause these 
'' products are primarily sold through a written prescription. This is in 
·
81:ursch, p. 43. 
9 Leonard G. Schifrin, "The Ethical Drug Industry: The Case for 
Compulsory Patent Licensing," Antitrust Bulletin, XII (Fall, 1967), p. 
893. 
contrast to drugs that are knawn as preprietary drugs which are 
' 
advertised ·to the general public and sald aver-the-caunter without a 
. ·.. 10 
· wri~ten prescription. 
11 
In addition ta these definitional c0nsiderati0nss the way products 
·are identified in.the ethical drug industry has imp0rtant ec()namic 
significance that is brought eut later in thi$ chapter. These preducts 
are designated in three ways. (1) Mast· drugs are derived chemically 
. 11 
and thus they have chemical names. (2) All ethical drug praducts 
12 
are given generic names which are basically common names. This is 
the name that is usually assigned by the disc0verer when it is deter-
mined· that the chenfical substance has desirable pharmaceutical praper-. 
ties. 13 (3) In addition ta th~se chemical and generic names seme drug 
firms utilize trade-names er brand-names; each of tbese is an original 
trad~arked name given ta a prc:iduct by a firm for its own particular 
drug. Thus, the same generic product sald by two ar more firms could. 
14 have many distinct trademarked brand-names. 
There are varying degrees ef cemplexity assaciated with these 
names. The chemical .. names are. very complex, the generic names less 
se, and the brand-names are usually very simple. 
lOJeremii w. Weselewski and Zdzislaw P. Weselowski, "The Ecenorp.ics 
ef Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Marquette 
Business Review, XIV (Fall, 1970), pp. 159-160. 
11Hugh D. Walker, Market Pewfr and Price Levels in the Ethical 
Drug Industry (Bleomingten, 1971), p. 18. 
12 . . 
·· Schifrin, p. 893. 
13 .· . . · .. 
. . Walker, p.. 18. 
14· . Schifrin, p. 893. 
12 
Structure· of the Ethical Drug Industry. 
One of the most.unusual characteristics of the ethicial drug 
industry is the nature of the demand for the product. The demander of 
the product is not the one who makes the decision on its purchase. This 
is due to the fact that.the purchase of this product requires a .written 
prescription from a physician who makes the decision as to product 
choice •. This characteristic was clearly elucidated by Estes Kefauver: 
As was pointed out oft~n during the h~arings, the ultimate 
con_sumer--the _patient-~is captive. The doctor, in writing the 
prescription, places the order for the merchandise; the con7 
sumer foots the bill. Thus the man who orders does not pay, 
and the man who pays does not order. 
Clearly, the physician is pivotal in the.scheme of things; 
he is the person who determines whether.a drug will or will 
not be sold.15 · 
Given this purchase condition, it is felt that the physician is 
relatively price insensitive and the price elasticity of demand is 
considered .to be quite low. Feldstein has roughly computed this 
elasticity for the products of a typical fi~ and found the coefficient 
interval to be 1.46 to 2.23. He concluded that this is relatively 
16 law. 
In addition, many states have anti-substitution laws which make 
it illegal for pharmacists to substitute generically equivalent d~ugs 
15 ' 
·Estes Kefauver, In A Few Hands: Monopoly Power in AmeDica (New 
York, 1965), pp. 8-9. 
16 Martin S. Feldstein, "Advertising, Research and .Profits in the 
. Drug Industry," Southern Ecenamic Jcmrnal, XXXV (January, i969), p. 
242. 
13 
for the trade-name drugs prescribed by the physician. This also reduces 
17 the price elasticity of demand. 
There has been some disparity. as to the number of firms·in the 
ethical pharmac~utical industry. Walker states that the industry is 
comprised of l:lpproximately 520 firms, 33 of which could be classified 
. . ·. . 18 
as lafge.. Table :i: shows Walker's breakdown of concentration in the 
ind,ustry. 
TABLE I 
WALKER'S CONCENTRATION ESTIMATES* 
Large firms 
Small firms selling under 
generic _name 
Small firms selling under 
brand name 
Totals 
Total 
;:N;14µt]g.~·t Sales 
o'r.Firm·•-··"-:1.,.Millions $ 
33 1,750 
<--~~~?· 
379 234 
108 204 
520 2,188 
Percentage 
of Total 
Sales 
80.00% 
10.68% 
9.32% 
100.00% 
*Dis.tribution of 1961 sales of Ethical Drugs by. Class of Firm. 
Source: 1lugh D. Walker, Market Power and Price Levels in ~Ethical 
Drug Industry (Bloomington, 1971), p. 8 • 
.;.17""':. . . Jadlaw, p. 70. 
18 .··. 
Walker, p. 5. 
The Pharmace~tical Manufacturers Asseciatien has indicated that 
the{e are approximately 700 firms, 19 and this is the number that is 
used by Schifrin~ · Schifrin states that th~ 20 largest ef these 700 
account for aver 90 percent of sales and 12 to 15 additional firms 
20 
acceullt fer half ef the. remainder. 
Cemanar states that .the drug. industry is mederately cencentrated, 
and he paints out that it weuld be classified as a Type Twe eligepely 
according te Kaysen and Turner's classification scheme. 21 A Type Twe 
oligepely 'is one in which the eight largest firms account for at;:'least 
14 
33 percent .of tetal .·saJes and the 20 largest firms account for 75 per-
cent ftr· .m4 .r.e.ftf industry sales. 22 c ' t ·ti. t'i t ... ... .. emaner s cencen ra an_es ma es are 
presented .in Table . IL · 
Tbe cencentrat~an data presented in these tables is somewhat 
misleading in that it is tao aggregative. · A mere precise presentatien 
of cencentratien data leeks at .. the substitutability of drug preducts. 
The· relevant market in the. drug industry has been defined. by same 
ecenamists by leaking at various the~apeutic categaries. These 
categeries are viewed as a set Gf products which are grauped because 
19 . Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Prescription Industry 
~ ~· (Washingten, D. c., 19'&1), p. 2. · A later edition ef this beak 
indicates that the."drugs" industry was camprised ef 1325 firms in.1964; 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associatien, Prescriptien Industry ·£!£..t· 
~· (Washingten, D. c., 1968), p. 15. · 
20 . Scbifrin~ p. 901. 
21 11 · WilliEµU S. Cemanor, Research andCempetitive Praduct 
Differentiatien in the Pharmaceutical.Industry in the United States," 
'Ecenemica~ XXXI (November, 1964), pp. 374-375. 
·22 ... 
Carl Kaysen and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust. Policy: M Ecenemic 
.!lli!, Legal Analysis· (Cambridge, 1965), p. 27 • 
there are similarities in the diseases treated and in the treatment of 
' ' 23 
these diaeaaea. 
TABLE II 
COMANOR'S CONCENTRATION ESTIMATES* 
Largest 7 companies 
Lara••t ;is coapanies . 
All ce.paniea. 
Sales 
Millions of Dollars 
$ 384 
800 
1,190 
1,945 
*Pharmaceutical Industry: Conceritration Ratios, 1958. 
Percentage 
20% 
41% 
61% 
100% 
Source: William S. Cornanor, "Research and Competitive Product 
Differentiation in the Pharmaceutical Industry in the·United 
States," Economica, XXXI (November, 1964), pp. 374-375. 
There have been·two studies conducted by Arthur D. Little, Inc, 
that deal with the concentration in various therapeutic categories. 
Table III presents the results of the Little study fo.1960. Table IV 
presents the results of a subsequent Little study on market concentra-
tien in 17 therapeutic categories for the period 1956-1965. 
Both Table& III and IV indicate that concentration in almost.all 
15 
of these drug markets is relatively high. It is also a~parent, however, 
23 ' ·.' .·· 
Comanor, .. "Research and Competitive Product Differenti~tio'Q in the 
Pharniaceutical.Industry in.the United States, 11 p. 377. 
TABLE III 
CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN TWENTY 
THERAPEUTIC MARKETS--1960 
16 
Therapeutic Market 
Market Share. of Top 
Five Firms (Percent) 
Analgesics 
Antacids 
Antibacterials and Antiseptics 
Antibiotics 
Antihistamines 
Antiobesity Preparations 
Antispasmodics and Antichol:f,.nergics 
Biological$ 
Cardiovilscular Preparations 
Cough and Cold Preparations 
Dermatological Preparations 
Diabetic Therapy Agents 
Diuret:f,.cs 
Hemantinic Preparations 
Hormones and Nonhormonal Antiarthritics 
Laxatives 
· Psychotherapeutics 
Sedatives and Hypnotics 
Sulfonamides 
Vitamins and Nutrient$ 
59 
70 
70 
60 
58 
71 
55 
66 
58 
45 
50 
78 
72 
57 
50 
66 
69 
62 
62 
52 
Source: Jesse. W. Markham, "Econorµic Incentives in t[\e Drug Industry, '1 
Drugs .in Our Society, ed. Paul Talalay -(Baltimore, 1964), p. 
169 •. 
TABLE IV 
CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN 1956-1965 
SEV~NTE~N THERAPEUTIC 
CATEGORIES 
Therapeutic Category 
Analgesic, nonnarcotic 
Antiarthritics,.nonsteroidal 
Antibiotics, broad and medium 
spectrum 
An~ibiot ics, penicillins 
Antihistamines · · 
Antiobesity, amphetamines 
Ataraxics 
Rauwolf ia"':'diui;etic combination 
Coronary vasodilators 
Diabetic the~apy, oth~r** 
Diuretics 
Hormones, corticoids 
Corticoids-with antiinfectives 
Oral muscle relaxants 
Psych0stimulants 
Sedatives, barbiturate 
Sulfonamides 
*Covers the peri0d 1959-1965. 
**Covers the period 1957-1965. 
Average Percent 
Share of Market 
by Dollar Volume 
1956-1965 Top 
Four Products 
55.9 
69.5 
48.0 
61.3 
66.7 
68.5 
71.1 
73.4 
64.3 
99.4. 
69.6 
52.4 
48.6 
53.2 
69.2 
62.6 
57.4 
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Average Percent 
Share of Market 
by Dollar Volume 
1956-1965 Top 
Ei~ht Products 
73.9 
84.1 
67.7 
78.6 
85.4 
79.1 
88.6 
92.2 
74.8 
99.8 
80.0 
68.5 
66.6 
71.8 
82.7 
70.8 
68.7 
Source: Arthur D. Little, Inc., "Trends in Market Shares for Ethical 
Pharmaceutical·Products, 11 reprinted in U. ·s. Senate.S~ect 
Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Monopoly, Hearings 
.2!l Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, Part 5, 90th · 
Cong., lst:>l;ess. (1968), pp. 1,788-1,805. 
18 
that the turnover of leading firms in certain markets can be high. This 
factor was discussed by Markham and h~ computed an inqex of firm turn-
over for the 1960 Little study. In 9 of the 20 therapeutic markets at 
least 50 percent of the largest firms in 1951 did not appear among the 
24 largest in 1960. Comanor has also observed this turnover phenomenon 
and he attributes it to the expansion of pharmaceutical research 
facilities and to the rapid rate of product obsolescence that is the 
. 1 f h h ff i h . d 25 goa o t e researc. e ort n t e.in ustry. 
According to the available evidence the drug industry is highly 
concentrated. However, certain analysts assert that the therapeutic 
classifications used to determine these market shares do not represent 
meaningful economic markets, and the concentration data would appear. 
differently if better definitions were employed-. More research is 
required to deal with this problem. 
Another import~nt aspect of an industry's structure is its entry 
barriers. "The term entry barriers refers to obstacles preventing new 
firms. from engaging in the production of a particular category of 
26 
output." 
It is widely accepted that there are no economies of scale entry 
27 barriers in the production of ethical drugs. The most prominent entry 
24Jesse W. Markham, "Economic Incentives in the Drug Industry," 
Drugs in .Q.!:!!. Society, ed. Paul Talalay (Baltimore, 1964), p. 168. 
25comanor, "Research and Competitive Product Differentiation in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry in the United States," pp. 376-377. 
26 Douglas Needham, Economic Analysis and Industrial Structure (New 
York, 1969), p. 97~ 
27Henry Steele, "Monopoly and Competition in the Ethical Drugs 
Market," Journal of Law and Economics, V (October, 1962), pp. 132'"'.'133. 
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barrier in the drug industry is the patent. 28 
Product differentiation i~ also considered an important entry 
barrier. Product differentiat:l.an in the drug industry hal!i! two facets. 
First, the research and develapment activity of.the industry is directed 
toward tl)e achievement of sc;:ientific and chemical product diff erentia-
. 29 
tien. · Sec~nd, once the R.and D effort has yielded a patentable drug 
product a trel!lendc:ius selling effort is used to get the prescribing 
30 physicians to use a particular brand-name drug. 
The ethical,drug industry is one in which preduc~ competition 
prevails threugh its Rand D activity and its selling effort directed. 
net at the.ultimate consumer but at the physician "purchasing agent." 
The patent.and economies of scale in research and developm~nt and 
advertising are censidered by seme,economists to.be the mest important 
entry barriers in this industry. 
Market Cendu.ct in the Ethical D_rug Industry 
The primary characteristics of the pricing behavior of an 
eligopolistic industry is thi;lt pricing decisions are made with a regard 
ta th~ impact of these decisions on a firm's rivals. A firm in this 
type ef industry must· take-into.account the collective interactions of 
its decisiens with tqe rest of .the it~dustry. There are several 
;~ ·~ ..... '. ' ~·. 
28 Jadlow,. p. 78. 
29 . Comanor, "Research and Technical Change in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry," p. 182. 
30 Steele, "Monopoly and Competition in the Ethical Drugs Market, 11 
p. 141. 
explanations for the manner in which pricing decisions are made in 
31 
oligopolistic industries. 
Certain aspects of t~e pricing behavior of firms in the drug 
industry were brought out in the Kefauver hearings. It was observed 
20 
that where only one or a few firms sold a particular product, prices had 
a tendency not to vary widely. Specific examples of this are shown in 
the antibiotic.drugs and corticosteroid hormones. Prices among a few 
32 firms became extremely rigid after a period of time. 
The antibiotic tetracycline renders an illustration of another 
type of behavior relating to market conduct in the ethical drug 
industry. It has been suggested that the existence of the cross-
licensing of patents in the drug industry could enhance the collusive 
behavior of its members. Costello suggests that such a meeting of the 
minds was evident among the producers of broad spectrum antibiotics in 
33 
what he terms the "tetracycline conspiracy." 
It is hypothesized by many economists that the conduct of the 
ethical drug industry is characteristic of an oligopolistic industry. 
These aspects of conduct are consistent with the concentration and entry 
barrier patterns discussed previously. 
31For a discussion of these decisions see Richard Caves, .American 
Industry: Structure, Conduct, Performance (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey, 1967), pp. 40-45. 
32 Henry Steele, "Patent Restrictions and Price Competition in the 
Ethical Drugs Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, XII (July, 1964), 
p. 203. 
33Peter M. Costello, "The Tetracycline Conspiracy: Structure, 
Cond\,lct, and Performance in the Drug Industry," Antitrust Law and 
Economics Review, I (Summer, 1968), p. 397. 
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-The theery of oligepaly has been somewhat lacking in the sense that 
no standard made! has been devised that can explain the pricing and out-
put decisiens of .firms in this type of market structure. One of the 
main reasons for this is that the behavior of firms in this type of 
·structure takes en many facets. These many facets de net allaw a. 
systemat::l,c analysis af the pricing and output decisions ·.~f the firms. 
One appraach that has been used ta analyze the rivalry in eligapely is 
h h . 34 t e t eery of games. 
The theary of:games is relevant to considerations_ef eligepoly 
because it deals with conflict situati<;>ns. Conflict situations are 
these·in.which the~e are two or more opponents and the actiens of one 
side depend :tn part en the acticms of its rivals. The theory of games 
invelves the mathematical techniques for analyzing these conflict situa-
tions and relies en 1simplified formal game models. The outcemes of 
these fermal game.models are knawn as payeffs. Games can.be two-person 
games er n7person games. Games are also classified as zero-sum games or 
nen-zere-sum games. A zero-sum game is ane in which the sum ef the 
pa:yeffs is zere. This mei;i.ns that ene wide lases exactly the same as the 
eth~r side wins. Non-zera-sum games are these in which the sum of the 
payoffs is net zero. The strategy af a participant in one of these 
conflict situations consists of the rules which determine his choices in 
all pessible situations. Games can be either finite or infinite. A 
34 . . 
Scherer presents a cancise discussian of tll.e role of game.theory 
as it relates te aligepaly in-his Industrial Market Structure and 
Ecenamic Performance, pp, 140-145. · 
finite games is <me in which the participants have a finite number 0f 
. ' '.' - 35 
strategies. 
The new product rivalry that exists in the .. ethical drug industry 
36 fits very well into a simple two-person, nen-zere-sum game medel. 
The payeff structure in this model results in what is known as.the 
prisoner's dilemma. This means that the participants end Up using 
strategies that place them in ap0siti0n that is worse than is neces-
22 
sary. This prisener's dilemma mGdel has als0 been suggested by Scherer 
as being applicable te advertising and new product rivalry in 
aligapaly. 37 
The prisoner's dilemma strategies that are open to ethical drug 
firms in their product rivalry .have be~n alluded to by Cemanar: 
The intreductian of new pr0ducts affects the c0mpetitive 
positien ef the firm in a quite different manner. Te the 
extent· .. that, rivalry takes the farm ef c0mpetitien between 
preducts which are priced at the same er similar levels, the 
number and .. character 0f new preducts wM,ch are introduced 
directly affect the demand fer the firm's output. If the 
firm introduces new pr0ducts which de the j0b 'better', th~n 
its output and total profits may be higher even if the casts 
ef the·. new preducts are greater than th0se ef their predeces-
sers and profit margins cerrespendingly reduced. The firm 
that falls behind in the race te intr0duce new pr0ducts may 
find its demand and prefits !ewer than its rivals', even.if 
it sheuld succeed in reducing the casts ef producing its 
elder products. This will be the case especially if.the 
price elasticities ef demand fer its preducts are relatively 
lew. 
35 E. s. Venttsel, An.Intreduction ~the Theory ef Games (Basten, 
1963), pp. 1~12. 
36 The use ef this game model in analyzing preduct rivalry in the 
drug industry was suggested by Pr0fesser Jeseph M. Jadl0w, Jr. and is 
patterned after .. an unpublished paper ef his entitled, "The Financial 
Crisis in Interc0llegiate·Athletics and the Prisener's Bile~a. 11 
37 Scherer, p. 143. 
This explanation involves the question of profit maximization 
under conditions of oligopoly. Where profit rates are minimal, 
the pressures to re<;l.uce.costs via the introc}uction of new tech-
niques are likely to be substantially less. But new products 
may be similar to those existing in the competitive model. 
Here the introduction of competitive new products by a firm's 
rivals may result in a large, and in some cases fatal, decline 
in the demand for the firm's output •••. it appears likely 
that.the prevention of declines of profit is more import~nt 
than the making of gains, that the maintenance of existing 
market shares through the introduction of new products is.more 
important than the reduction of cost, and tQat a firm will 
work harder for the former purpose than for the latter. This 
means, merely, that in an uncertain world firms operate under 
some· kind of minimax strategy. On this basis, firms will 
emphasize new products rather than new processes in their 
research efforts.38 
23 
This situation can be depicted using two firms, A and B, each with 
two possible strategies as shown in Figure 1. One possible strategy 
would appear feasible because, as pointed out by Comanor, the firm 
could stand tQ mak~ gains due to the reduction of research and develop-
ment outlays. This strategy could possibly result in substantial gains 
to tt~e firm. 
The second strategy would be for the firm to e~phasize R and D for 
new products. This is feasible for it can be used, as stated by 
Comanor, to prevent the decline of profits and to maintain ex~sting 
market shares. Figure 1 shows the profit payoffs that might occur to 
typical firms in this prisoner's dilemma situation. The numbers above 
the diagonals in the profit matrix are the profit possibilities for firm 
B and those below the diagonals are fol:: firm A. 
The worst that can happen to firm A if it deemphasizes R and D for 
new products is a profit gain of $2 million. The worst that can happen 
to firm A if it emphasizes R and D for new products is a profit gain 
38 Comanor, "Research and Competitive Product Differentiation in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry in the Un:i,.ted States, 11 p. 378. 
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Al - deemphasize R and D for new products by 
firm A. 
A2 - emphasize R and D for new products by 
firm A. 
Bl - deemphasize R and D for new products by 
firm B. 
B2 - emphasize R and D for new products by 
firm B. 
Figure 1. Payoff Matrix 
of $25 million. This is the situation for firm B as well so that the 
emphasizing strategies of A2, B2 dominate.. Both firms would be better 
off if they deemphasized Rand D for new products, strategies A1 , B1 , 
but their most conservative strategy dictates that, given the uncer-
tainty of their situation, they choose to emphasize Rand D. This. 
paradox:. then, is tqe drug firms' prisoner's dilemma. 
One qualification to this analysis must be pointed out. In the 
real world, the emphasizing strategies, A2 , B2, may in actuality have 
payoffs that are greater than those of the deemphasizing strategies, 
25 
A1 , B1 , e.g., because the Rand D associated with new products may act 
as an effective entry barrier that enhances the profit possibilities of 
tQis activity. 
Perfermance ef the Ethical Drug Industry 
The performance aspects that .. are dealt with in this section 
concern the ecenomic efficiency of the industry--especially as they 
cencern profit levels and the price-cost relationship of firms in the 
industry. The economic progressiveness of the industry is discussed 
separately.in a following section. 
It is generally accepted among industrial organization economists 
that monopoly power yields profit levels that.are above "normal." One 
of· the noti.ceable characteristics of the ethical drug industry is the 
39 persistence af excessive profits. · Several studies have revealed high 
profits in tqis industry. 
39schifrin~ pp. 908-909. 
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Four studies that have looked at profitability in the drug industry 
. 40 place it first, second, or third in terms of rate of return. This 
high level prefitability has.been maintained over a fairly long period 
of time as indicated by these studies. The competitive norm allows 
excess profi~s to be made for short time periods but as new firms enter 
an industry these profit levels will be driven to.a normal level. If 
the average profit rate of all industries in these studies indicates a 
normal rate of return, the drug industry has been able to maintain a 
rate ~.hat is considerably above the norm. 
It has been argued that the high profit levels in the drug industry 
are warranted by the fact that it is subject to a great deal of risk in 
providing health-sustaining new drugs and these high rates reflect the 
necessary risk premium. Two of the previously mentioned studies--the 
Fisher and Hall and the Conrad and Plotkin papers--took into account 
risk as an aspect of profits. The Fisher and Hall study shows that, 
with risk taken into account,. the drug industry still has the highest 
rate of return of the 11 industries studied. 41 The Conrad and Plotkin 
40These studies include Gordon R. Conrad and Irving H. Plet~in, 
"Risk and Return in American Industry," reprinted in U. S. Senate, Select 
Commit~ee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Monopoly, Hearings on Com-
petitive Problems in the Drug Industry, Part 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1968), p. 1841; Federal Tracie Commission, 11Rates of Return for Iden-
tical Companies in Selected Manufacturing Industries, 11 reprinted in 
U. S. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on 
Monopoly, Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, Part 5, 
90th Ceng,, 1st Se13s. (1968),·p. 1833;.Irving Fisher and George R. Hall, 
"Risk and Corporate Rate of Return," reprinted in U. S. Senate, Select 
Commit t.ee en Smal,l Business, Subcommittee en Monepoly, Hearings on 
Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, Part 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1968), p. 1835; and, Hugh D. Walker, Market Power and Price Levels in 
the Ethical Drug Industry (Bloomington, 1971), p. 27. 
41 Fisher and Hall, 11Risk and Corporate Rate of Return," p. 1,835, 
study shows that the drug industry is the fourth riskiest of the 59 
industries studied. 42 
One final consideration of these rates of return for the drug 
industry must be noted. It has been observed that for accounting pur-
poses, drug firms tend t<;> expense theii;- expenditures for research and 
development in the current period rather than capitalizing these 
27 
expenditures. This causes the accounting rate of return to appear same-
what higher than that of not so research intensive industries. It is 
hypothesized that the capitalization of these R and D expenditures in 
the drug industry would make the rate of return for the industry lower 
43 
and more representative of the economic.profit rate. 
Other indicators of monopoly power than excess profits can be 
examined when the efficiency of an industry is being evaluated. One of 
these indi<,!ators is the relationship of the price of the preduct to the 
costs af its praductian. In the purely competitive model the price of 
a good equals its marginal cost. Under many circumstances the demand 
far a good represents its social valuation and the long-run marginal 
cost represents the social cost of producing the product. For firms with 
~monopoly power the marginal value of the good is greater than the costs 
of productian so that society would be beti'.:er off if more resources were 
44 devated to the production of that good. 
42conrad and Pletkin, "Risk and Return in American.Industry," p. 
1,831. 
43 Thomas R. S.t:auffer, "The Measurement of Corporate Rates of Return: 
A Generalized Formulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science, 2 (Autumn, 1971), pp. 467-468; and, Jesse J. Friedman and 
Murray N. Friedman, "Relative Profitability and Monopoly PoiiTer, 11 Confer-
~ Beard Recard-, IX· (December, 1972), pp. 49-58. 
44c. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory (Homewood, Illinois, 1969), 
p. 27 5. 
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A certain amount of ·evidence was presented.in the Kefauver hearings 
showing the relationship between the manufacturing cost and the price of 
,., 
several drugs. From the examples chosen it was apparent that tbe·prices 
~of some drug products were substantially greater than their marginal 
. 45 
costs. 
Walker has .made estimates of the differentials of t~e prices of 
I . 
the brand ... names of large manufacturers and generic drugs of small firms. 
Here it is assumed tqat t4e generic products approximate fairly closely 
the campetitive situat;ian so that· the price and marginal cost of these 
are relatively close. Walker concluded from his estimates that drugs 
that are sold by,large firms under brand ... names.are on tl;le average 2.14 
times as great in price as drugs sold under generic names by small 
46 firms. 
The preceding aspects of the performance of the ethical pharma ... 
ceutical industry are·offered as limit~d evidence ef certain economic 
in,efficie'Qcies. 'rhe excess profits and the persistence of .monopoly as 
indicated by the cases Gf prices exceeding marginal costs result in.the 
misallocation of resources in thi~ ind~stry, As already indicated, the 
progressiveness aspects of the perfermance of the industry are dealt 
with in detail in a later section of this chapter. 
To summarize the preceding sections, the structural conditions of 
the drug industry indicate an industry that is characterized by a 
relatively high level of m~rket concentration with the existence of 
45u. s. Senate, Cemmittee en the Judic~ary, Subcommittee on Anti ... 
trust and Mcmopely, Hearings~ Administered Prices in the Drug Industry, 
86th Cong., 2nd Sess., (1960), pp. 15 ... 24. 
46 . 
Walker~ p. 26. 
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several important entry barriers. The market conduct of.the industry 
··.,.;., ... 
takes on many characteristics of an oligopolistic industry. And, 
finally, the performance aspects discussed indicate a considerable 
degree of reseurce misallocation in, the ethical drug industry. 
R and D Activity in .. the Drug Industry 
The last.two sections of this chapter deal with the econol'!lics of 
research and development. The first of these sections presents a 
general discussion of the ecanomics of R and D, emphasizing those facets 
most directly related to the drug industry. The last section specif-
ically discusses the R and D activity of the ethical drug industry. 
Economics of R and D 
Research and development has been characterized by Mansfield in the 
following manner: 
'Research' is original investigatfbn directed to the discovery 
of new scientific knewledge, and 'develapment' is techJJ,ical 
activity concerned with nonroutine problems encountered in 
translating research findings into products and processes. 
Although there is.no chear.line between research and develop-
ment, they are by no means the same thing. Whereas research 
is conducted to obtain new knowledge, development is required 
to reduce the knowledge to practice,47 · 
It is cus~omary to distinguish between invention and innovation 
when.dealing with Rand D. Invention is basically the,discovery of some 
unique new prod~ct or process. Innovation is the application of a newly 
invented product or process in a conunercial manner •. It ·is the com-
mercial application of an invention that gives it its economic 
47Edwin Mansfield, Industrial Research and Technological 
Innovation: An Econometric Analysis (New York, 1969), pp. 6-7. 
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' 48 signif:.l.cance~ Innevation is of primary import~nce,in the ethical 
pharmaceutical industry. 
The output-of the research and development activity carri~d on by 
business firms is referred to as technological change. Technolegical 
change is an advancement in the state of learning that results in.a 
change in the make-up of equipment, products, or organizatien tQ.at were 
previously in use. 49 The technolegical change ef the drug indU:stry is 
tije development of marketable new.drugs. 
Much o.f . the work in the area of research and development has 
c~ncentrat;:ed an what determines the level of R anq D activity wit;hin the 
firm. The majer determinants ef the amounts ef resources or the,expend-
itures a firm makes an R and D include the expected prefitability af its 
R and D program. T~is implies that the same factors that .influence the 
output of :any good influence.a firm's Rand D. Thus, the factors.a£ 
' ' . 50 51 
demand, cost, and; supply all play a rele. · ' 
Mansfield. ha!il applied an·ecqnemetric analysis af a.small sample ef 
firms in the drug industry to determine t~e impartant factars of 
research and develapment expenditure. These facters included the lagged 
·actual Rand D expenditures, the sales of the.firm in the current 
48 ' Richard R. Nelsan, "The Ecanemics a:e Invention: A Survey of .the 
Liter~tur~, 11 Journal & Business, XXXII (April, 1959), p. 102. 
49 ' 
.Mansfield, Industrial Research and Techn0.lagical Change: ~ 
Ecenametric AnalYsis, p. 4. ' 
50 ' 
. Ibid., P• 5. 
51 These .facters were alse faund by Edwin Mansf:.l.eld and Richa~d 
Brandenburg, ''The :A.llecation, Characteristics, and Outcame ef. the ,.Firm's 
Research an4 Develep'ment Portfolie: ' A Case Study, 11 -Jeurnal 0£ Business, 
39 (October, 1966), pp. 447-464,. to be, the primary determinants af .. the 
R.and D activity of the research component of one large u.·s. firm. 
period, the expected rate of return. on the firm's R and D program, and 
52 the firm's lagged profits. 
Grabowski has also analyzed the determinants of R and D expend-
itures in the drug industry using an econometric model. Grabowski's 
model found that the significant determinants of R and D expenditures 
31 
included an index of the research ~roductivity of the firm which was the 
patent output of the firm obtained from its scientific personnel inputs, 
a lagged profit variable, and an index of diversificaticm. 53 
Rand D.and its resultant technological change does two things. 
First, it develops new techniques that affect the production functions 
for existing products •. Second, as an alternative, it develops new 
products. The resources and expenditure~ used in.achieving these 
results are important, as indicated -by--the afore~ent-ioned ... studies, but. 
in the drug indu.stry it is not the expenditures that are the important 
measure. The development.of new products serves as the technological 
change in the drug industry. It is necessary to know the rationale 
behind this new prod4ct develepment. A major portion of this rationale 
cames from the ap.par.en-t?- oligepolistic structure in which there is 
product competition acting a~ a defense mechanism. This aspect was 
discussed in terms af the prisoner's dilemma. 
This is net the complete rationale for th,e peJ;s-!stan-t desire for 
firms in the drug industry to increase their' output of .n~w products. 
52 . 
Edwin Mansfield, "Industrial Research and Development Expend-
itures: Determinants, Prospects, and Relation to Size of Firm and 
Incentive Output," Journal of Political Economy, LXXII {August, 1964), 
p. 323. -
53Henry G. Grabewski, "The Determinants of Industrial Research and 
Development:: A Study .of the Chemical, Drug and Petroleum Industries," 
Journal !f Political Ecanomy, LXXVI (March-April, 1968), p. 297• 
It is necessary to know how the R and D of the drug firm and its 
development of new products fit into the production processes of the 
fipn. A possible method-of analyzing this is suggested by using a_ 
54 
model introduced by Clemens. 
Clemens' model _deals with. mult;i-product production treated as a 
32 
problem of price discrimination. New products are an important element 
of the strat;egy of the firm, and they are devised with the intent of 
55 
using a firm's idle capacity. This appears to be important in the 
operation of ethical drug firms. Drug firms may differentiate· their 
products and create inelastic demands by the introduction of new prod-, 
ucts. The_ dynamics ef the industry are such that ther'e are high rates 
of new product introduction and rapid obsolescence so that as a newly 
.,. 
• patented,product of a firm loses market share, the firm experiences 
higher and higher excess capacity. 56 
'r-his fact is closel,.y interconnected with the··defensive natu-re of R 
and D by firms in the drug."_indUcs.try. The applicability of Clemens' 
model to this defensive aspect comes from the· fol.lowing statement: ''J "The 
invasion of new markets may.have the purpose·of keeping potential 
competitors at their distance. 1157 This is why drug firms emphasize R 
54 . 
Eli W. Clemens, "Price Discrimination and the Multiple-Product 
F'irm, 11 Readings in Industrial Organization and.Public Policy, ed. 
Richard Hefelbower and George w. Stocking (Homewood, Illinois, 1958), 
pp. 262-276. 
55Ibid., p. 263. 
56 
· Schifrin, "The Ethical Drug Industry: The Case for Cempulsory 
Patent Licensing," p. 899. 
57 Clemenl!l, "Price Discrimination and the Multiple-Product Firm, 11 
p. 263. 
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and D and why the industry ,has been characterized as having aspects of 
an oligopali$tic structure. 
The relevance of .Clemens' analysis with regard ta the drug industry 
is also expressed by the fellowing stat~ment: 
The elimination or addition of a trade-mark, or a few acces-
sot:i(!s, ·is the means by which product differences are created 
ta th~ end, that strong and weak markets can be exploited at 
dif fe,ring margins .of profit. 58 
' 
The ess~hce of Clemens' analysis is tha~ if there is any market 
where the price of the product is greater than the marginal cost.then 
this encourages the firm to enter that market. Firms will produce to 
the pain~ where the least profitable unit of output will be produced at 
marginal.cost. 
The model presented by Clemens is used here as a means of illus-
trating how technological innovations in the.form of new. products are 
translated into the production activity of the ethical drug firm. 
Several assumptiens are made which include the following. (1) Products 
·are. not cc;msiqered to be hom0geneous, but there is a hemogeneous unit of 
output. This means that the.firm can produce several products utilizing 
the same production processes. (2) Closely allied with the first 
assumption is the assumptien that resources are easily transferable 
-;,:...-
.·within the firm which allews the productien of several products. 
Clemens cites the chemical industry as an example of the relative ease 
af transferability of resources ameng producti;;. It is ebvious that; this 
relative resource mobiLiey could exist within drug firms. (3) The 
market characteristics faced by the firm range from strong manepoly to 
pure competitian. This is a realistic assumption fqr the drug industry. 
58rbid •. '· 264 P• . • 
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Newly patented drugs that are widely promoted may have manopoly market 
positions. As drugs become commercially mature and generic substitutes 
become av~ilable, the closer to pure competition drug markets become. 
(4) Clemens as$umes that the demand curves faced by the firm are not 
related--the new product areas are relatively diversified. In the past 
this assumption may .not appear to apply for i~ has been observed that 
only a few firms deal extensively in each therapeutic market~ The 
results of.the present study indicate this may no longer be the case. 
In order to get new approved products there is an indication that drug 
firms must diversify their R and D efforts. 59 Thus, there may or may not 
be related demands faced by the drug firm. (5) It is assumed that.the 
firm has a certain amount of excess capacity which allows the firm to· 
increase production without a great increase in marginal cost. This 
follows from the way the demand for drug products has a tendency to 
deteriorat.e. It has alse been indicated that the largest portion of the 
drug firm's total costs are fixed costs so that marginal costs do not 
60 
change appreci~bly when new outputs are added. (6) New markets are 
invaded in the order of their profitability. This clearly applies to 
'the ethical pharmaceutical industry becau~e firms enter those markets in 
which R and D activity is directed and results in a patentable product. 
- It is..:_--t:his ,a~tivity that may yield highly inelastic demands. (71 · 
59 Refer to page 95. 
60 Comanor, "Research and Competitive Product Differentiation in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry in the United States," p. 375. 
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Finally, it .is assumed that the firm maximizes profits.·6-1~ 62 
To illustrate his model, Clemens presented an analysis of five 
markets.in which profits are maximized when production is.distributed 
among the five markets in such a manner that marginal revenue in each 
market is equated with marginal cost. In Figure 2 EMR is the horizontal 
line depicting equal marginal revenue. This is established by the 
intersection of the firm's marginal cost curve and the marginal revenue 
curve for the last market that can be secured profitably. The limit to 
this is a market with a perfectly elastic demand curve. Each market has 
its own 0 output axis with a corresponding demand curve. From these 
demand curves it is possible to get the marginal revenue curves for each 
market. These demand curves are shown in Figure 2 as n1 through n5 with 
their respective marginal revenue curves, MR1 through MR5 . In these 
63 five markets five product prices are established as P1 through P5 . 
For a drug firm these could be five products with n1 being the most· 
recently patented drug with the most inelastic .demand. The other demand 
curves could represent maturing brand-name products or, as the demand 
curves become relatively more elastic, these could represent generic 
products which the firm is praducing to.fill out any excess capacity 
that.it might have. 
Thus, a drug firm may devise any new drug products to maintain 
monopoly in these markets and then may fill out the rest of its 
61An analysis of the rev~lance of prof it maximizing behavior on 
th~part of drug firms in their R and D activity is presented in 
Jadlow, pp. 16-23. 
62 Clemens, "Price Discrimination in the Multiple-Product Firm," 
pp. 266-267. 
63rbid., p. 267. 
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productive capacity in the manner shown. As long as there is a 
profitable market, a drug firm is encouraged to enter and it will often 
enter with generic drugs to fill out this. productive capacity. 
Q/$ 
Figure 2. Multi-Product Production 
It is the purpose of the research and development units of drug 
firms to produce new products that can be introduced in the preceding 
manner. As such, these new products can be viewed as the output of 
the R and.D facility. This is basically the way it is treated by 
Comanor, and this is discussed more fully in Chapter IV. 
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Characteristics of R and D in the Drug Industry 
The main issues concerning t4e progressiveness of the industry are 
whether its R and D effort results in sacially desirable new products 
and whethe~ the patent privilege in its present form is the .necessary 
incentive to.assure a flow of these products from the indus~ry. It .is 
difficult to measure the social returns and/or costs of the R and D 
activity of the ethical pharmac~utical industry. The private returns 
and/or costs bear heavily in establishing the industrial organization 
position of the industry and have been referred to previously. 
One of the primary canflicts that resulted from the Kefauver 
hearings on the drug indl,lstry concerned the progressiveness ef the 
industry •. The Senate Subcommit~ee on Antitrust anq Monopoly concluded 
that th~ value of .the industry's research and developm~nt did not hav~ 
much social significance. It ·was stated that most of the medically 
., 
significant new drugs came from outsid~ the inc\ustry, and that the 
" 
industry concerned itself with "melecule manipulation" which resulted in 
64. drl,lgs therapeutically equivalent.ta those already being sold. 
The drug industry is the most re~earch-conscious of all 
non~defense industries, with more company-financed research 
and development in relation to sales than any oth~r industry. 
In 1964, the all~industry tot~ls for research and development. 
eXpendit~res as a percent of sal~s was 4.4 percent; }~r drugs 
and medicine~, 4.7 percent. For company-financed research 
and d~velepment, moreever, the all-industry tetal was 1.9 
percent, as compared to 4.5 percent for drugs and medicine. 
For t'1e period 1956 to '19?4, the average annual increase in 
research and development expenditures for the drugs and. 
medicines industry was 13 percent, compared ta an economy-
wide increase of slightly less than 10 -e~,rcent in total 
64william s. Comanor, .. "The Drug Industry and Medical Research: The 
Ecenom:f:.cs ef the Kefauver. Cammittee Investigations, 11 Journal af ¥ 
Business, 39 (January, 1969), p. 12. 
38 
industry expenditures and bet;ween, six and seven percent in, 
tetal cempany-financed expenditures.65 
Schifrin also asserts that the drug industry ccmcl?ntrates mere. en 
basic research than dees the economy as a whole or dees the industrial 
66 
. sector. The abselute magnitude of e~penditures for research and 
develepment is alee large in the,drug indu~try where $400 million.was 
67 deveted to.that purpese in 1966. 
As indicated by the preceding, the reseurce use for R and D by the 
industry is extensive. This is reflected in the manpewer utilization ef 
drug firms in the ,recen,t pae;t. In 1959 the .tota+ number of res~rch and 
developmen~ employees ef pharmaceutical companies was 11,400 and 
increased.ta an.estimated 16,4.00 in 1965 and is expected te increase to 
19,000 by 1968. This represents an annual percentage increase of ~ix 
.. percent. The pattern ef employment. ef R and D personnel has been very 
censistent eve~ the peried with 55 percent of the.research staf~s manned 
by scientists and 45 percent manned by technicians and supperting 
persennel. It ·has also been observed that about 25 percent ef the total 
Rand D staffs held a docteral degree, 35 percent hold a master's er 
68 bacheler's degree, and 40 percent held less than a bacheler's degree. 
65 Sc;:hifrin, "The Ethical Drug Industry: The Case for Compulsory 
Patent.Licensing," pp. 898-899. 
66Ibid~, p. 899. 
67 Jereme E. Schnee, "Research and Technological Change in the 
Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry," (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Pennsylvania, 1970), p. 192. 
68 U. S. -Department _of Health, Educaticm and Welfare, Reseurces fer 
Medical.Research: Trends _!!l Rand D Manpewer in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry 1959.;_65 and 1968 (Washington, D. · C., 1966), p. iii. 
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In utilizing these resource inputs, Comanor has pointed out that 
the industry appears to use them in a complementary man~er rather than 
a competitiv~ manner with o~her.users of tQese inputs. In 1960 the drug 
industry provi4ed more than 30 percent of the funds for medical research 
but cmly used l? percent of the persons doing research with the .Ph.D. 
degree and only 5 percent with the M.D. degree. He feels that drug R 
and D pravides useful division of labor af R and D input$ and the ~~-->­
persons employed by the industry are not really substitutable with non-
industry personnel so that.the opportunity cost of industry research 
69 
relative to non-industry research is comparatively law. 
The follawing statement.by Walker summarizes the performance aspect 
of the pragressiveness af the ethical drug industry and the dilemma that 
must be faced in imposing public policy on the industry. 
. -· 
Investment by the industry in research and development is 
substantial and, on the whole, socially productive. If 
policies ta reduce market power in the drug industry were 
intraduced, it would be important tq ensure that most of this 
research and develapment activity were maintained. Thus, if 
a palicy were predicted ta impair the willingness or ability 
af th~ industry to conti~ue to finance research and develop-
ment, then the cqsts of financing this activity by same other 
method shauld be charged against whatever benefits arise from 70 . the intraduction of.the policy. 
This chapter has autlined the industrial organization. ~ramework 
'~'"-
which serves as the basis for the present study. The chapter also 
included a summary of the economics of the ethical drug industry and the 
role ef research and development within the industry. 
69 Cemaner, "The Drug Industry and Medical Research: The Ecanomic:;:s 
ef the Kefauver Committee Investigations," p. 17. ··' 
70 Walker, p. 141. 
CHAPTER III 
1962 DRUG AMENDMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON R AND D IN THE DRUG INDUSTRY 
In 1962 a major institutional change was imposed upon the ethical 
1 pharmaceutical industry with the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments. 
This chapter outlines the aspects of these amendments that affected the 
R andD activity of the industry. Certain hypotheses as to the economic 
impact of these amendments on tl).e industry's Rand D are posited. A 
summary of earlier statements and studies of this R and D impact are 
alsa included. 
Aspects of the 1962 Drug Amendments Relating 
to Research and Development 
In October, 1962, after several years of investigations by Senator 
Kefauver's Subcommitt.ee on Antitrust and Monopoly, the .1962 .Drug Amend-
ments were enacted into law. The amendments were divided into three 
parts. The first part deals with the development, naming, and advertis-
ing of drugs; the second part deals with the factory inspection of drug 
1 Drug Amendments, 76 Stat. at L. 780 (1962). These are reprinted 
in U. S. Senate, Hearings on Interagency.Coordination in Drug Research 
and Regulation, Part 2, pp. 409-425. 
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manufacturing; and the third part concerns the registration ef drug 
. . 2 firms. 
It .is the first part of these amendments that is most important.to· 
this study for it contains sections dealing with the requirements for 
the.development of new drugs. One of these sections relates to the 
effectiveness and safety of new drugs. Prior to the amendments only the 
substantial proaf of safety was necessary to gain approval of new drugs. 
The amendments required not only the proof of safety of these but alse 
substantia~ evidence af their effectiveness. If this evidence cannet·be 
provided te the Sec~etary ef.Health, Education and Welfare, then there 
may be refusal to approve the new drug, or withdrawal.of prior appraval. 
The evidence that must be provided to prove.this safety and effective-
ness includes certain monitered investigations which would include 
clinical investigations under the supervfsion .of qualified experts. 3 
Anotl:tersection·of the first part of the amendments requires that 
new drug developers maintain certain records which are to be made avail- . 
able to the Secretary of .Health, Education, and Welfare upon request. 
Reports concerning the clinical investigatien and ether relevant infor:-
4 
matien are ta be maintained on appreved new drugs. In additien ta this, 
this sectian ef the amendments eutlined the.following: 
The Secretary is alsa autherized ta require: (a) the submis~ 
sia~, befare ~ny clinical testing, af 'preclinical tests 
(including tes·ts on animals)' . ef a drug that justifies any 
prepesed clinical testing; .(b) the sponsor of a new drug 
investigatian to obtain a signed agreement from each inves-
tigator (before distribution of experimental drugs) that 
2Jadlew, "The Eccm0mic Effects Cilf the 1962 Drug Amendments," p. 92. 
libid~, pp. 92•93. 
4 . . 
· Ibid., p. 93. 
patients administered the drug will be under his supervision; . 
(c) the sponsor of a new drug's investigation to keep records 
and make reports (including analytical reports of investiga-
tors) of information from investigational use.of the drug · 
that will enable the Secretary to evaluate the.'safety and 
effectiveness' of it if a new drug applicat,ion is later filed. 
Finally, the section provides that regulations issued about 
new drug testing shall requi.re. sponsors of tests to obtain 
from i~vestigators using the drugs certification that they 
will inform human beings (or their representatives) being 
administered such drugs that they are being used for experi-
mentai purposes, and tha~ they will obtain the 'conse~t' of 
these people if it is net cantrary to these patients' best 
·interests.s 
In order for a new drug to.be put on the market, another section 
42 
of the amendments requires that the Secretary must approve it as to its 
safety.and effectiveness. A period of 180 days is allowed for the 
consideration of a.new drug application and this period may be extended; 
furthermore, there is no automatic approval of new drugs once the time 
period has expired. Hearings may be requested on non-approved new 
6 drugs. 
Subsequent to the passage ef the 1962 Drug Amendments, the FDA 
7 issued new regulaticms in accordance _with the provisions of the amend-
ments. These new regulatiens concentrated on what was necessary for 
the investigational use of a new drug. Specifically, the regulations 
outiined the precise information that.spensors of new drugs are to make 
available.to clinical investigators and also the records and reports 
. . 
-that clinical investigators are t0 keep and maintain. These regulati,ons 
increased the necessary requirements in the ferm·of records and reports 
5 . 
·Ibid~, pp. 93-94. 
6 Ibid. , p. 94. 
7A complete summary of the regulations.is presented in Jadlow, "The 
Econemic.Effects af the 1962 Drug Amendments," pp. 98-102. 
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that were to provide substantial evidence on the safety and efficacy.of 
new drugs. 
These amendments and regulations.imposed a major institutional· 
change upon.the ethical drug industry, and more specifically, upon the 
research and development activity of the industry. This institutional 
change forms the basis of the several hypotheses that; are offered to 
assess the impact of this change .cm the R and D activity of the drug 
industry. 
Review of the Literature on the Economic 
Impact of the 1962. Drug Amendments 
on Drug R and D 
. . 
Soon after the·effective date of the amendments several industry 
sources verbalized the expecte4 economic impact. None submitted any 
real evidence,of this-impact, but they.did indicate some .!.Priori· 
predictions about thi~ impact. 
Beyer indicated that·these amendments would prove very costly 
. . 8 
to the research and development activity of the drug industry. · He also 
anticipat.ed the type of, scale economies that might be expected as a 
result of .the amendments: 
The new. regulations requil:e a more precise and current 
auditing .of.the on-going activity of each clinical.investiga-
tion than-either we or the physician have been used to in th,e 
past~ Whether or not this is worth the added effort and 
expense, it certainly does enc;ourage the use of mechanical 
8Karl H. Beyer, Jr., ''The Effect of _the New F. D. A. Regulations 
on the Drug Industry," Clinical Pharmacology) and Therapeutics,, 5 
(January-February, 1964), p~ 1. 
data processing equipment to minimize. both delay and the. 
tremendo11s amount of detailed clerical work that would be 
required otherwise .. 9 
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Gibson noted that the average cost of doing clinical research would 
be increased substantially as a result of the amendments and regula-
10 tions. Gibson also noted the type of scale economies that might exist 
due to the incr~ased reporting and record keeping, and how these might 
11 put the small firm at a comparative disadvantage. "The legislation 
bearing Senator Kefauver's name has not lowered drug costs nor helped 
12 the small manufacturer." 
One of the first e~onomic studies of the effects of the 1962 Drug 
Amendments was condt,tcted in 1966 but was not published until 1970. 
This is a study by Wesalowski and Wesolowski. The primary evidence 
offered in this.study indicated that the amendments have significantly 
d d h b f .. 1 h i 1 . . 13 re uce t e num er o new sing e c em ca entities. The cost effects 
on Rand D were noted by relating the industry's lagged total expend-
itures with the number of new drugs introduced to get an "average cost" 
for new products. This computation showed a marked increase in this. 
14 
average cost between 1962 and 1963. Without citing any significant 
9 Ibid., P• 5. 
lOAugustus Gibson, "The Effect of the Investigational Drug 
Regulations on Drug Research and Development," Food, .Drug, and Cosmetic 
Law Journal, 19 (March, 1964), p. 155. 
11Ibid., p. 159. 
12Ibid. , p. 161. 
13Jeremii W. Wesolowski and Zdzislaw P. Wesolowski, "The Economics 
of .Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Marquette 
Business Review, 14 (Fall, 1970), p. 167. · 
14Ibid., pp. 169-170. 
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evidence the.authors also stated that the pharmaceutical industry is 
obtaining diminishing returns from its R and D activity. These 
diminishing returns are attributed.to higher research costs due to the 
increased cost of ,all research inputs, the growing difficulty in.solving 
certain medical problems, and the.reduction in the number of new drugs 
approved by the FDA. 15 · Wesolowski and Wesolowki, again without any 
evidence, indicated that the new drug regulations would impose a heavy 
burden on small firms which they classified as having sales under $10 
million. 19 
In an extensive study of the determinants of research and develop-
ment in one drug firm, Jerome Schnee hypothesized that development 
costs have bE;!en significantly increased due to the amendments. His 
sample of post-1962 new drugs was too limited for him to measure the 
increased costs or the overall impact of the 1962 Drug Amendments on the 
. 17 
individual firm. . 
A recent econometric study by Baily has attempted to assess the 
impact of the.amendments on the Rand D activity of the industry. He 
used.an industry-wide input-outI.>ut relation to investigate the Rand D 
activity of the pharmaceutical industry. His output variable was the 
number of new drugs introduced and his input variable was the.Rand D 
expenditures of the industry. Baily found that the.simple correlation 
between thesE;! expenditures and the rate of new drug development is 
negative. The possible explanation that.is given for this contradiction 
15Ibid., p. 17. 
16Ibid., pp. 171-172. 
17 . Schnee, p. 95. 
46 
is that the FDA regulations of 1963 had a tremendous impact on the 
industry, and this threw the relationship off because.of the great 
increase in the average cost of new drugs. To allow for this impact, 
Baily assumed th~t his functional relationship had shifted due to the 
amendments, and he looked at the data prior to and after 1962 independ-
ently. This removed the negative coefficient for R and D expenditures, 
but the magnitude of the.coefficients and their stat:i,stical significance 
were not considered to be plausible. Baily explained that this 
phenomenon resulted because the new regulations were not.the sole 
18 
reason for the increased .costs of d~veloping new drugs. 
One of tl;le most comprehensive analyses of the.economic effects of 
the 1962 Drug Amendments is provided in the 1970 University of Virginia 
19 Ph.D. dissertation of Joseph M. Jadlow. The study utilizes an 
industrial organization framework to study all facets of the amendments' 
effects on tl;le drug industry. An important el~ment of this study 
concerns the effects of the amendments on.the Rand D activity .of .the 
industry. 
The conclusions of Jadlow's study concerning the impact of the 
legislation on research and development include the following: 
(1) The 1962 Drug Amendments were responsible for significantly 
increasing the costs of doing drug R and D. This conclusion is based on 
the observation that the average expenditure per new single chemical 
entity has risen considerably since the enactment of the amendments. 
18Martin_Neil.Baily, "Research and Development Costs and Returns: 
The U. S. Pha~aceutical Industl;'y, 11 Journal .Q.f Political Economy, 80 
(January~February, 1972), pp. 71-72. 
19 Jadlow, "The Economic Effects of the 1962 Drug Amendments." 
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There was an observed upward tre"Q.d in these costs pric;>r tQ 1962, but the. 
20 increase in co&1ts after 1962 was in excess of the pre-1962 trend. In 
addition, the average expendi~ure.per all new drug products as a measure 
of average cost was observed. 
· merit of a new mark.etable. drug 
Again, the average cost for the develop-
21 increased signif:l,.cantly af.ter 1962• 
(2) The second mE!-j or. conclusion co~cerns the economies of . scale 
in Rand D issue. It was hypothesized that 11there are some·economies 
ef scale associated with the activities firms must perfarm to.satisfy 
the new amendments and regulations!.22 · This.hypathesis was·tested.by 
. ' . . . . . . 
observing the relationship of the average R and D casts per professional 
R and D employee. for small firms. with the same relationship for large 
f.irms. If the research costs .per professional employee have risen 
faster for the ·smal:!, firm relative to tl~e large firm, then this .would 
23 . ind:f,,cate that scale economies are·indeed present. Using this type of 
a te&1t it.was found that.subsequent to.the amendments and.new regula-
tions 1 .the costs per professional employee for small firms had risen 
the great~st. 24 This indi~ates that; scale economies are present. · · 
(3) The last major concl~sion of the Jadlaw study on the impact of 
the aniendments on R and D deals with the reduction in the flow of new 
drug products. Two hypathesized reasons were given for the.reduction in 
this f~ow. One of the reasons was that the proof of efficacy 
20 Ibid. I p,. ,;149; 
211bid~ 1 pp. l5l-153~ 
:. 22Ibid;,. ;'. jf. lS"h,~> 
. 
23tbid. I P• 159. 
24Ibid. I p. 161. 
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requirements have cause4 part of this reduction _in new drugs. The other 
reasen·was.that the increased.cost~ of drug research and development 
25 hav~ precipitated part of the.decline in new drug output. · 
Te test the hypoth~sis.concerning the efficacy requirements, the 
sharp reduction in allnew d_rugs since 1962 was noted. In addition, it 
was assumed that three·types of new,products weuld more precisely 
reflect the impac~ of the efficacy requirements. There would be a 
reduction in, the n~mber of new combination products, new dosage forms of 
. old produqts, ·an~ new. duplicates of, ald single chemical entit:f,es. A 
reduction·cal,lld be expected in the last twa because when approval ef 
these was made before the,amendments only proof of safety was required. 
After the amendments, firms wo.uld have ta haye extensive proof.of 
26 
efficacy of .these products. Regarding the new combinations, it -had 
been shown th.at the risks associated with these new drugs were greater 
so that it was expected the FDA would now more heavily weigh these risks 
against the effectiveness of these cembinatior>. products, and they would 
be less likely to approve these.new drugs. The sharp reduction in the 
number of these three categories of new products was given as evidence 
that the efficacy requirements have reduced the number of new products 
27 going tQ the.market. 
To test the.reduction of new products due tE? increased Rand D 
costs, the study concentrated on the reduction in the.number af .new 
single chemical entities. Since these are the mast innovative of new 
25Ibid., P• 163. 
26Ibid., P• 164. 
27Ibid., P• 167. 
drug products, .the efficacy requirements wauld.have relatively less af 
· · an impact an these than it would on .. the other. categories of new drugs. 
Thus, it was assumed that a reductian in the number of new single 
chemical entities wauld reflect the impact of rising R and D casts on 
.the flow of.new drugs. A sharp reductian .in the number of the~e new 
products was.observed.subsequent ta the passage of the amendments. It 
must be neted, however, that.a downward trend in this category.of new 
products had.begun prior ta the amendment~ so the canclusion on this 
28 
aspect is not quite as clear. To further. evaluate this .. situatioti, 
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a categorizatio~ of new single chemical.entities as significant advances 
was made~ Using this appreach a sharp reductioq in the number af 
' ' 29 
significant advance~ was ebserved after the 1962 Drug Amendments. 
Hypotheses Cencerning th~ Economic Effects 
af the Amendments on R and D 
in the Drug Industry 
The 1962 Drug Amendments and t~e new regulations,require 
substanti~l preef of the efficacy and safety of.new drugs before they 
may be marketed,. and tQey provide for a substantial expansion of ,report-
ing and clearing procedures for the cl~nical testing of experi~ental 
new drugs. It seems likely.that these requirements hav~ raised the 
casts of daing drug research. Limited evidence has already been 
30 gathered on the.raising of these costs. 
28Ibid., pp. 168~170. 
29Ibid.;, PP• 171-17.2. 
30Ibid., p. 156. 
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In order to gauge the impact of the 1962 Drug Amendments, a model 
of technical change or research output will be utilized. This model. is 
31 patterned after a model previously introduced by William S. Comanor 
and is analagous to a production function. This model incorpora~es R 
and D inputs, size, of firm, the lriteraction between size of firm and 
research inputs, and diversification as determinants of research 
output. 
The main thrust of the present study is to investigate the effects 
of .the 1962 Drug Amendments on the productivity of professional R and D 
personnel in the drug industry. This is a positive investigation and 
the major hypothesis (Hypothe,sis 1) is: 
' •,:.-
Given the significant institutional change caused by.tje 1962 
Drug Amendments, it can be expected that during the 1965-1970 
period the marginal productivity of professional research and 
development personnel.has beceme negative.32 
The implicatiGns af this hypothesis are that prefessional R and D 
persennel are needed just to satisfy the increaf:ied requirements of the 
amen4ments and the new regulations and this has adversely affected the 
output flow of new drugs. The necessary proof of safety and efficacy 
would require more animal and clinical studies that would tend to 
increase the utilization of these personnel. 
Another factor that bears on the increased utilization of 
prafessional Rand D personne,l is the increased.record and reporting 
pracedures set up by the new drug regulations for investigational new 
31 Camanor, "Research and Technic~l Change in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry." 
32The assumption that the marginal productivity of professional 
R and D personnel is positive prior to the amendments is based on the 
results of Camanor's study for the 1955-1960 period; see Comanor, 
"Research and Technical Change in the Pharmaceutical Industry," p. 188. 
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drugs. It has been estimated that before these drugs can be sent out 
almost 11 different "statements" must be forwarded to the FDA. Three of 
these statements must,be forwarded for each clin:J,cal investigator in 
the study. Many types of periodic reports must be made to the FDA, and 
at least.three sets ef recerds'must be.maintained. In addition to 
these, the clinical investigators must maintain comprehensive and 
33 
·detailed recerds and reperts. Thus, the increased requirements for 
the proof of safety and efficacy and the increased record keeping have 
diverted a portion ef the effort of professional R and D personnel and 
have adversely affected their productivity as it relates to providing 
new drug preducts. 
It might be expected that after the passage of.the 1962 Drug 
Amendments, scale economy benefits can be experienced for larger firms 
in the drug industry. Scale economies are where a proportionate 
increase in all inputs results in a proportionately greater increase in 
output--output in this.case.being limited to innovative .new drugs. 
These scale economy benefits are implied if the relationship between the 
size of the firm and the scale of research personnel inputs have 
pesi1;:ive influence on the research and development output of the 
34 industry. These influences lead to a second hypothesis (Hypothesis 
2): 
Since the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments, the interaction 
between the size of firm and the scale of research inputs now 
has.a positive influence on the Rand D output of firms in the 
33 Jadlow, ''The Economi~ Effects ef the 1962 Drug Amendments," pp. 
122-123. 
34This is the reverse ef what Cemanor found in his previous 
analysis ef tbe industry for the 1955-1960 time period. See pages 56 
and 63. 
industry. This relationship is indicative of the scale 
economy benefits now available. 
The possibility that.scale economy benefits are now available is 
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based on the notion that it now takes a certain minimum staff of people 
to organize and maintain the records and reports as required by the 
amendments andregulations. As firms are large, both in size of firm 
and size of R and D component, they may be more able to establish and 
maintain this minimum staff of people. Thus, it takes some minimum 
number of professional R and D personnel as well as supporting or 
a~xiliary personnel to engage in research and developmen1;: in the 
35 industry. · 
In addition to this, it may be possible for drug firms to benefit 
from R and D specialization of labor and from the use of large-scale 
36 
computer facilities. It is expected that large firms may have a 
comparative advantage in dealing with these increased research costs. 
An important aspect of .the economies of scale issue.in drug 
research and development concerns the role of supporting personnel. If 
Hypothesis 2 can be supported, then it can be expected that supporting 
personnel now play a more important part in drug R and D. This stems 
from the idea that it takes some minimum level of technicians and 
clerical personnel just to satisfy the increased requirements of the 
regulations and these people can.be a posiqve influence on the Rand D 
. 
35This 
involved in 
auxiliary. 
study will distinguish between two types of personnel 
drug R and D activity--prof essional and supporting or 
These are more clearly defined in Chapter IV. 
36Jadlow, "The Economic Effects of the 1962 Drug Amendments," p. 
125 .• 
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output of drug firms. 37 In addition it may now be that larger firms 
obtain scale·economy advantages from the use of these personnel because 
they can utilize specialization and division of labor in meeting the· 
requirements of the regulatiot).S• This hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) con-
cerl'ling this. aspect of the.impact of the amendments is: 
Supporting personnel relative to professional R and D inputs 
are now significant contributors to the research output of 
·drug firms. The importance of .these supporqng personnel, 
leads to scale econ0my benefits for larger, sized, drug firms. 
A final c0nsideratiot). of tJ::le 1962 Drug Amendments'. impact on the. , 
Rand D activity of the drug industry is.the possibility that the amend-
ments have changed the relationship between technical change.in the 
industry and the scale of research activity. It may be that in addition 
to, or now independently of, the fact that Rand D output.is primarily 
determined by the level of R and D inputs, the scale of research and 
development is now·determined by the level of Rand D output. This 
.result could be expected because the basis for selecting firms for this 
study is that they introduced at least one new single.chemical entity 
during the 1965-1970 time period. Thus, it .appears that these firms 
were extensively committed to research and development and this 
extensive R and D may serve as an effective entry barrier in the 
industry. It appears that.a good many of the competitive forces within 
the drug indu$try take place through this R and D. It is thus conceiv-
able that th~s activity feeds upon itself in the following manner: 
extensive R and D serves as an effective entry barrier and it produces 
new drug products which in turn create profits, and finally these 
37 This is the opposite of what Co~anor found in his previous study 
of the industry. See page 67. 
profits can then be reinvested for new and expanded research and 
38 development activity. The final hypothesis (Hypothesis 4) of the 
study deals with this issue: 
The 1962 Drug Amendments have increased the R and D entry 
barriers to the extent that it is now evident that not only 
may Rand. D output,be determined by Rand D inputs, but the 
scale of R and D inputs are now determined by J,:J;search 
ou~put. 
Each of these hypotheses represents a significant change in the R 
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and D activity of the ethical pharmaceutical industry since enactment of 
the 1962 law. Substantiation of these hypotheses woulc;l indicate the 
great impact that the 1962 Drug Amendments have had upon the research 
and development activity of the industry. 
The present chapter has outlined the 1962 Drug Amendments and the 
FDA regulations that followed that relate to research and development. 
A summary of several of the,studies that have dealt with the possible 
economic impact on R and D of these amendments was given. Finally, four 
hypotheses have been advanced as to what impact these amendments and 
regulations have had on the research and development activity of the 
ethical drug industry. 
38This is the opposite of Comanor's previo~s results. See pages 
67-68. 
CHAPTER IV 
MET~ODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES 
Th~ present chapter provides a description of the basic model that 
is used in this study to explain the research and development activity 
of the ethical pharmaceutical industry. This chapter also includes a 
description of the data sources used and the characteristics of the 
sample of firms for the period 1965-1970. 
Summary of Comanor's Study 
1 In 1963, William S. Comanor completed a study of research and 
development activity in the pharmaceutical industry for the.years 1955-
1960. Comanor's investigati~n focused on s~ch things as whether·large 
size was necessary for firms to engage in research and development, 
and whether R and D grows more or less than in proportion to increases 
in the size of the firm. Comanor also investigated the relationship 
between R and D and the rate of technical change, and the relationship 
between the size of the firm and Rand D productivity. 2 
One of Comanor's most important conclusions was .that there were 
substantial diseconomies of scale in R and D for moderate and large 
1william S. Comanor, 11The Eccmomi<;:s of Research and Development in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 11 (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation,:"'Harvard 
University, June, 1963). 
2 Comanor, "Research and Technical Change in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 11 p. 182. 
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sized firms. On the other hand, he concluded that there were economies 
3 
of scale in the research and development activity of small firms. 
Comanor used the term economies and diseconomies of scale in the tra-
ditional sense such that, for example, economies .of scale exist when 
a doubling of inputs results in more than a doubling of output. 
Comanor used.a multiple regression technique on a firm cress 
sectional basis to explain various aspects of drug research and develop-
ment activity. The following equation represents the estimated 
relationship which he used: 
(4.1) 
Cetnanor assumed that .. the introduction of new. products. is the 
primary objective of the research and development activity ef drug 
firms. He suggested that the purpose of this introduction of new 
products is to ac~ieve scienti+ic and chemical product differentiation. 4 
Two· separate designations of new product introduction were used. by him 
to measure technical.change in the drug industry. 
"New single chemical entities," which usually represent the most 
innovative new products, was one.of the designations used. These are 
unique.new drugs (each with one active ingredient) which have not been 
marketed in the United States before. The other designation was all of 
the new products introduced by the various drug firms. These designa-
t~ons served as the dependent variable of the regression equation. In 
order to assess the economic·impact of these variables, they were 
3 Ibid!, p. 190. 
4 Ibid., p. 182. 
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weighted on the basis of their sales for two calendar years after their 
introduction. 
In his study, Y1 is the total dollar sales of all of the new 
single chemical.entities for the first two years after a firm introduces 
them. Y2 is the total dollar sales of all new products, including new 
-·-.single chemical entities, duplicate single chemical. entities, new 
combinations of active ingredients, and new dosage forms of previously 
5 introduced products. 
The first independent variable, R, is the scale of research and 
development variable. This is also designated in two ways. The first 
designation, R1 , is the average number of professional R and D personnel 
employed by the firm in 1955 and 1960. R2 ~s the average number of 
total R and D personnel employed in the research facilities during the 
two years. This R2 variable includes all professional and supporting 
personnel in these Rand D facilities. 6 
For the most part professional personnel are defined as those 
persons who hold either the Ph.D. or the M.D. degree. Although the 
precise definition of professional personnel was not given, it appears 
that_persons with training constituting at least the four-year college 
degree were included if they had the skills to engage in scientific 
investigation. Supporting personnel includes all personnel involved in 
the R and D function who hold something less than these degrees. This 
s Ibid.• , p. 183. 
6rbid. 
includes a wide range of personnel down to, and including, clerical 
7 personnel. 
These definitions are similar to those of other manpower studies 
of the pharmaceutical industry. As an example, the study of the man-
power trends in the ethical drug industry made for the National 
Institutes of Health by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Assaciation 
defines these accordingly: 
R ~ D Scientific and Professional Staff includes all persons 
whose work requires the application for research and deve!op-
ment of knowledge, skills, and scientific techniques, in the 
life, physical, engineering, or mathematical sciences, 
acquired through the completion of a four-year college course 
(or its equivalent) with a major in these fields or in med.,-
icine or other health professions. Exclude persons who have 
formal training in the sciences but who are not actively 
engaged in research and development. 
Technicians and Supporting Personnel for the R & D staff 
includes persons who.may hold some academic degrees at the 
bachelor's level or above. Technicians include persons 
actually engaged in technical work at a level which requires 
knowledge of the life, physical, engineering, or mathematical 
sciences comparable at least to that acquired through techni-
cal institutes, junior colleges, or other formal pest.,-high 
school training less extensive than four.,-year college training 
or through equivalent on-the-job training experience. Sup-
porting Peracmnel includes persens who provide literature, 
clinical, statistical, or other services specifically for R & 
D staff.8 
R2 is a quadratic term for the above R and D variables that is 
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introduced to account for the fact that there is a curvilinear relation-
9 
ship between research effort and technical change. S is the size 
variable and it was computed as the average of yearly prescription and 
7Bowker Associates, In9., Industrial Research Laboratories of the 
----United States, 13th Edition (Washington, D. C., 1970), p. viii. 
8 U. s. Departme~t of Health, Education, and Welfare, p. 17. 
9 Comanor, "Research and Technical Change in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry," p. 185. 
hespital dollar sales between 1955 and.1960. I is an interaction 
""~'<'l rh · · 
variable which is the product of scale of research and the size ef the 
firm. D is a variable that accounts for the degree of diversification 
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of the drug firm. This was measured in three ways. o1 was computed as 
the average dollar sales by the firm in each therapeutic market. These 
average sales were not picked up unless they accounted for at least two 
percent of the firm's total sales. 2 D was computed according to the 
follawing: 
_ 1 _ firm's sales in largest market 02 - firm's total sa.l.es . (4. 2) 
The sales used in the computation of D2 are based on averages for the 
six-year period. o3 is the product of D1 and D2• In order to account 
2 for the problem of heteroscedasticity, Y, R, and R are deflated by the 
size of the firm. 1'0 
The relationship investigated by Comanor is analagaus to a 
praduction function. Y measures the output of the.Rand D facility of 
the drug firm and the primary input is the.number of research personnel. 
This does not incorporate the level of the capital input, but the labor 
inputs represent one of the most important aspects of the drug firm's 
R and D effort. 
The analysis of the various form~ of the regression equation 
caused Comanor to conclude that as the firm increased in size the gains 
resulting from new product introduction increased in greater proportion. 
He also concluded that for small firms economies of scale in R and D 
were present and diseconomies appeared as the size of firm increased. 11 
lOibid., p. 184. 
11Ibid., p. 187. 
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Cemaner elaborated en this economies of scale issue in the·· 
follewing manner. By multiplying equation 4.1 by S, it can be 
expressed in the general form: 
. 2 
Y =. a + bR + cR , (4.3) 
where a, b, and c are parameters whose values are derived from the 
regression ceefficients of his multiple regression model. b = - e - fS 2 
where e and f are again parameters derived from the regression ceef-
ficients, and a is a functionof S and D. Taking the partial derivative 
of equatien 4,3 expresses the marginal productivity of R and D 
persannel :. 
'dY/'dR = b + 2cR. (4.4) 
Due to t~e fact that b is inversely related to S, 'dY/'dR is inversely 
related to S. For given values of R, 'dY/aR declines with the square of 
S. He concludes ftom these relationships that the marginal productivity 
of prefessional research personnel is inversely related to the size of 
the firm. 12 . 
The elasticity of research innovation was also considered. The 
relevant dependent variable was new single chemical entities and the 
·elasticity was expressed as. oY/'dR·R/Y. The elasticity was computed at 
three separate paints in the size distribution of firms. This looks at 
the percentage change in research output with a unit percentage change 
in R and D activity with S being held constant. At a firm size con-
sidered to be small the elasticity was.1.39; for a size considered to be 
moderate the elasticity was computed to be 0.61; and for a size con-
sidered to be large the computed elasticity was 0.51. These 
12Ibid. 
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elasticities suppert the results onscale economies implied by the 
' 13 
regression equation. 
McGee has-criticized Comanor's use of the term returns to scale in 
research and development in his studies of the pharmaceutical and other 
·indust_ries: 
What·does 'return to scale'c mean? In general, economists say 
there are increasing retur~s to scale if, with constant 
technolegy (:?) when a firm, say-, ... deubles the·. inputs of all. 
factors of production per unit time, output per unit time more. 
than.doubles. Now make something called 'research resources' 
a factor of production along with (the usual) 'labor'. and 
'capital', and waive the complication of lags. In the.usual 
sense·, .presumably, there w0uld be increasing returns if doubl-
ing of labor; capital, and re~earch more than· doubled eutputs. 
What_. Comanor. found, at most, is that his measure of 'research' 
inputs de>es not·increase proportionally with (an imperfect 
measure of) the overall size of firm. His situation therefore, 
is riot a question simply related to returns to scale as that 
phenomenon is commonly understood, It seems, rather, to be a 
case of variable proportions and what he wants to say hinges 
on the question of whether 'research' and other factors are 
complem~ntary in production, and to what.extent.14 
McGee contends that if the returns to.scale issue deals with the 
relationship of research costs to research output when research and. 
development is taken al~ne, .then.the method of looking at Rand D in a 
' 15 prad4ction functian·se~se is logicalty flawed. · These criticisms are 
important to the present study for they have significant implications 
r~lative to the .impact of ,the 1962 Drug Amendments on drug research 
and development. ·These implications are more fully discussed in the 
empirical results chapter. 
13Ibid., PP• 187-188. 
14 Jahn,S. McGee, In Defense of Industrial Concentration (New York, 
1971), p. 105. 
15Ibid. 
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Table V summarizes the empirical results of Comanor's study. Y1 
represents the dependent variable defined as the first two year sales of 
new single chemical entities. Y2 represents the two year sales of all 
new products. R1 denotes professional R and D inputs, and R2 takes into 
account total personnel working in a drug firm's research and develop-
ment facility. 11 and 12 represent the interaction variables when R1 
and R2 are used respectively, and D stands for diversification. 
Camanor concluded that.the data fitted the.model better as it is 
expressed by equation 4.5 in Table V. Thus, technical change is 
statistically better defined when it appears as the sales of new single 
chemical entit~es. Professional R and D personnel is also the more 
16 important input designation in explaining this technical change, 
In Comanor's estimates the Rand D input variable, R1 , had a 
negative sign which he stated was not due to the research process in the 
industry, but was due to the fact that in some of the estimates there 
were zero values for the dep~n!fent variable.. This caused statistical 
problems which would make the sign of the regression coefficient become 
17 
negative. 
The. quadratic term for R and D input had a positive sign associated 
with it and was found t 0 be highly significant~ This significance 
18 
appeared for both designations of the R and D input. 
16 Comanor, "Research and Technical Change in tqe Pharmaceutical 
Industry," p. 184. 
17 Ibid. 
18lbid. 
TABLE V 
COMANOR'S REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
Y1 =.422 - 4.671Rt + .547Rf* + .0000344S* - .00000012811 - .130D* (.136) (1.285) (.107) (.0000083) (.000000031) (.040) 
Y2 = .873* - .060R1 + .557Rf* + .0000289S** - .000000106It* - .lllD** 
(~222) (2.098) (.175) (.0000136) (.000000051) (.066) 
Y1 = .471* - 1.989R~ + .112R;* + .OOU0300S* - .000000051I~ - .120D* (.150) (.981) (.031) " (.0000102) (.000000017) (.044) 
. 2 Y2 = .932 + l.381R2 + .118R2 + .0000194S - .000000034I2 - .lOOD (.232) (1.513) (.047) (.0000157) (.000000027) (.068) 
* Indicates statistical significance at 99% confidence level. 
** Indicates statistical significance at 95& confidence level. 
·2 
. <!. = .40) (4.5) 
2 (R = .22) (4. 6) 
2 (R = .28) (4. 7) 
2 (R = .18) (4.8) 
Statistical significance for the regression coefficients is determined by one-tailed t-test, and the 
significance of the R2 by the F-ratio test. 
Source: William S. Comanor, "Research and Technical Change in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 47 (May, 1965), p. 185. 
°' VJ 
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The size of firm variable in three of the four equations ·in Table V 
was found to be sigriif icant and is positively related ta research 
output. 
Since new products have been weighted by their sales during 
their first twa years after introduction, we should expect our 
measures of technical change to be influenced by such factors 
as distributien facilities, selling effort, and firm reputa-
tion. To the extent that these factors.are correlated with 
firm size, the size variable introduced into the equations 
will be pasitive. Firm size appears to have acted to increase· 
the gains resulting from new product introduction, and these 
gains increased more than proportionately with size of firm.19 
Because it was necessary to deflate by size of firm to deal with 
the problem of heteroscedasticity, the interaction variable was intro-
duced to incorporate a scale factor in the relationship. This inter-
action variable was also used to explain scale economies of drug 
research and development. 
In an input-output relationship, economies of scale exist if .a 
praportionate increase in inputs results in a greater than proportionate 
increase in output. Diseconomies of scale are indicated by less than 
proportionate increases in output from proportionate increases in in-
20 puts. The usual explanation for these diseconomies of scale is that 
th~re are managerial problems of coordination and control that exist in 
large scale operations. 21 .. This is the same approach used in looking at 
the research output of the drug industry, and the interaction variable 
is an important element in dealing with the scale economies issue. 
19Ibid. 
20 James M. Hendersen and Richard E. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory, 
(New York, 1958), pp. 202-208. 
21Richard H. Leftwich, .'fh!. Price System and Resource Allocation, 
(Chicago, 1966), p. 145. 
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The interaction variable allews.an analysis of the problems of 
management coerdination and the control of large scale R and D 
facilities. The inclusion of tl?-e size variable alone resulted in com-
peting effects en the research output of the firm. On one hand, size 
.allows the.firm te benefit more from its research output through the use 
ef large premotional and distribut±en facilities. On the ether hand, 
these advant.ages may be effset by the decrease in efficiency in the 
research facility due to the.co0rdinati0n and central preblems asso-
ciated with large size. Using the size variable alone in the regressien 
equations weuld absorb the variatiqn frem these competing effects. This 
is why Cemaner intreduced the interaction variable. Thus, the size 
variable in the regressien equation weuld pick up the .prometional and 
distributional advant~ges of large firms and the interaction variable 
would allew for the inefficiencies of large size as reflected by the 
22 neg~tive sign of .the coefficient. 
At the lewer range ef the distributien ef firm size, I is 
small relative to deflated values ef RD, 23 se that the primary 
impact·of research is designated by the ceefficients of RD. 
For·small firms, there appear to be increasing returns to 
scale of research. At the upper range of the distribution, 
•. Jic;>wever, I may be large relati.ve t0 RD/S and the major deter-
minant. of research output cemes frCilm th~ coefficient ef the 
interaction variable. In this case, research and development 
may exhibit decreasing returns ta scale. It appears that we 
cannet deal with the question of ec:ronomies or diseconemies of 
scale in research without considering the size of the firm in 
which .the research is undertaken. While increasing returns 
may persist so 10ng as the firm i~ small, there is likely to 
be.decreasing returns when the.firm becemes·large. Thus, 
. 22 .· 
Cemanor:, "The Economi.cs of Research and Development in the 
Pharniaceutical Industry," p. 137. 
23 Cemanor refers to the.Rand D inputs as RD whereas this study 
uses :R. 
there is probably a point l:>eyond which a.research establishment 
becomes relatively inefficient.24 
,.;(- · All. three of Coman~r' s diversification variables were found to be 
statistically significant. The sign of these was always negative and 
this indicated that higher.research output can be achieved when a firm 
25 
. ·cancentrates in a few preduct areas, ether things being equal. 
The acale economies issue was further explered by Cemanor as he. 
determined the marginal preductivity ef R.and D and the elasti~ity 
relatianships from his estimated equations. The true expressien for 
equation 4.5 when the deflation factor is incorperated is: 
Y/S • .422 - 4.671R/S + .547R2/8 + .00003448 
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- • 000000128R • 8 - .130D .• (4. 9) 
Multiplying both.sides of the equation by 8 renders the equation in the, 
form;of equat-i~n 4.3: 
Y • .422S "' 4.671R + .547R2 + .000034482 
\ 
.000000128(R•S2) - .130(D•S). (4.10) 
Rearranging equa1:ien 4.10, it can be expressed as: 
Y • .422S + .000034482 - .130(D•8) 
+ ( - 4.671 - .00000012882)R + .547R2. (4.11) 
· Equatio~ 4.11 allews th.e calcul1:1.tion of v1:1.lues far a, b, _and c in 
eq\latien 4.3: 
a= .4228 + .000034482 - .130(D•S), 
b .. - 4.671- ~o(>oqoo12as2, ;i..J.. 
c ... 547. 
24 . 
· Ceman(i>r,"The Econemics of Research and Development in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry," p. 140. 
25 ... ·
· · Cemaner,. ''Research and Technical Change in the Pharmaceutical 
Indust_ry," p. 184. 
67 
From.these estimates the empirical estimate of the marginal 
productiv:f,ty of research and development for the period studied could be 
given as; 
3Y/3R = - 4.671 ~ .OOOQ00128s 2 + 2(.547)R. (4 .12) 
By using selected values for three firm sizes, Comanor estimated the 
·elasticiti~s (3Y/3R·R/Y) that were given earlier. These were given to 
support his sc,ale economies conclusions. 
Comanor also considered some alternative hypotheses to this main 
hypothesis that technical change in the drug industry is determined by 
the faCt(l)rS of research inputs, size of firm, the interaction between 
firm size and scale of research, and diversification. · One of these 
hypotheaes concerned the role of supporting personnel in relation to 
the profes~ional R and D inputs. Specifically, he looked at whether 
a large ratio of. supporting personnel (i.e., technicians and clerical. 
workers) to professional personnel was necessary to increase the 
efficiency of the research facility. This was investigated by intro-
ducing an additional variable into the regression equatiQns; this. 
variable was the ratio of supporting personnel to professional R and D 
personnel, averaged for 1955 and 1960. The coefficient for thie; added 
variable was found to be statistically insignificant and was negative. 26 
The idea was also investigated that the .causal relationship between 
technic~l·change in the drug industry and Rand D inputs was such that 
the introduction of n~w products determines the level of R and D for the 
drug firm. This could come. abou~ because these new products ccmld 
26 . 
Ibid., pp. 188-189. 
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increase the profits of the drug firm which woultj. in turn allow the firm 
. 27 
to inc~ease its investment in research and development. 
This alternative hypothes~s means that the R and D intensity of the 
drug firm is greatly influenced by new product introduction. This was 
tested by loeking at various lead-lag .alternatives for the period 
covered. If Rand D int~nsity is determined by technical change, then. 
it could be expected that technical change at the start of the period 
wou14 be better correlated with the R and D inputs at the end of the 
period.. If the R and D inputs at the beginning of the period are better 
correlated with the new product eutput at the end of the period, then 
this.supports the original hypothesis. Comanor performed these tests 
and found that. the test of the alternaq.ve hypothesis was. not statisti-
cally significant, and . the lead-lag structure .consistent with the 
original hypotheds was highly.significant. 28 
Comanq>r had three main sources for his da.ta. The information on 
new drug products was supplied by Paul de Haen, a consultant to.the drug 
industry. The data on the sales of these new products and the total· 
sales for firms during the 1955-1960 time period were supplied by R. A. 
Gosselin and Company, Inc., which is a market research firm. The data 
on t~e number of R and D inputs was available in the tenth and eleventh 
editions of the National Academy of:Sciences--National Research Council 
publications, Industrial Research Laboratories.of the United States. 
These gave.a breakdown of the number of research personnel in a drug 
27 Ibid., p. 188. 
28 Ibid. 
firm and presented them accarding ta whether they were praf essianal or 
29 
supporting personnel. 
From these data sources a sample of 57 firms was chosen. These 
were restricted .to U. S. drug firms and were also restricted so as not 
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t'il include firms that involved. pharmactputical mergers during the period 
investigated. If a pharmaceutical firm merged with a non-pharmaceutical. 
firm and it appeared that the integrity of t~e drug firm was maintained 
then it was included in the sample. Also, pharmaceutical mergers that 
., 30 
occurred in 1960 were allowed. 
Comanor's sample is essentially non-rando~ and it is not dominated 
by large firms. The size distribution is J-shaped and one-third af the 
31 
observations fell in the smaller size class. 
The .scale of the research facilities in Comanor's study had a range 
of 4~0 - 590.5 when using professional Rand D personnel, and.7.0 -
1103.0 when total personnel were count;ed. The means were 74.7 and 158.4 
32 
respectively, and the standard deviations were 112.6 and 246.5. 
Techniques of Present Study 
The present study is based on the period 1965 to 1970, a period .in 
which the full effects of the 1962 Drug Amendments should be evident. 
The t~chniques that were utilized by Comanor are being duplicated as 
closely as possible so that; a valid camparison of the two time periods 
29Ibid., p. 183. 
30rbid. ·. 
31Ibid., pp. 183-184. 
32 . Cemanor, "The Economics of Research and Development in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry," p. 120. 
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can be.attenipted. Thus, a model ef·technical change in tqe drug 
in~ustry is.employed:in th:f,.s study in a like .manner to that of Comano~ • 
. Since Cemanot's work, new single chemic~l entities have become, 
recognized as the most innovative output of drug research and develop-
ment. For this. reason this study will first .look at the initial two 
year·sales of'newsingle chemical entities. This definition of.Rand D 
' ' 
out.put was found tq be the most significant in Comaner's study, and 
·this is censicl.ered the ideal measure. of the inve,ntive output -ef the 
industrybecause it takes into account the economic impact ef drug 
:"1nt\ova.tion. This impact is impertant for it represents the ,innovative 
demand ·of new drugs before the il)fluence.of the promotional effort on 
33 the part of drug firms becemes effective. 
11) addition tc:> this measure, hewever, the,present study uses the 
number of new single,chemical.entit;:ies to represent the autpu~ of tl)e 
research and development.facility ef a,drug firm. This has some, 
limitations. since.it dees net weight the economic·importance of the R 
and D effort, 34 but it.has been used in previous studies ef the drug 
industry and ethe~ industries. Mansfield has used a weighted count ef. 
the numbe'J;'. af il)novatiori.s for the chem:f,.cal, oil.and steel industries i;o. 
35' shew.inventive output. Baily has recently used the number of new, 
drugs on at;i unweighted basis as the measure ef aggregate R and D eutput 
33Grabowski, p. 294. 
34 h' ' 
·Part ;(!)f t e economic impact is accounted for in this measure 
since only these drugs that had some.positive doll~r sales are counted. 
35 ' ' ' 
Mansfield, Industrial Research and Technological.Innovation: An 
Ecc:momet;:ric Analysis. (New. York,· 1969), pp. 40-41. · 
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for the drug industry.36 The count of new single chemical.entities 
seems preferable .to the number of total new,drugs since the former are 
generally more innovative. Also, carrying the analogy of the production 
function further, the number of new single chemical.entities as the 
output in physical units is consistent with the typical production func-
tion which measures the output and the inputs in physical units. 
The researcµ and development variable is used in the two forms 
presented by Comanor, and all of the other variables are employe4 in the 
manner of Comanor's presentation. The model is an input-output.model 
for research and development and is expressed in equation 4.1. A sum-
mary of the definitions.of the variables used in the present study 
follows: 
Y1 - total two year sales of new single chemical entities. 
Y2 - total numbei:: of new single chemical.entities produced by ' 
the drug firm. 
~.·~·· 
R1 - total pr~fessional R and D personnel, average for 1965 
and 1970. 
R2 - total R and D personnel including supporting personnel, 
average for 1965 and 1970. 
S - size of firm as measured by the a~erage prescription and 
hospital sales for the period 1965-1970, 
I - interaction, scale variable which is the product of S and 
R. 
D - diversific~tio~ variable measured in the three ways used 
by Comanor. 
T/P - ratio of.supporting personnel to professionals, average 
for 1965 and 1970. 
Given the significance of the model of technical change in the drug 
industry, changes in the model for the two time periods should reflect 
36 Baily •. 
the impact of the 1962 Drug Amencjments on the R and D activity of the 
ind~stry. Acceptance or rejection of the alternative hypotheses 
·should also be an indiCation of the impact of the amendments. 
Data Sources and Sample Char~cteristics 
Data Sources 
The data sources for the present investigation are virtually the 
same as those.used by Comanor. There are three primary data sources. 
The new single chemical entities introduced in the relevant period are 
37 presented by Paul de Haen in the .Journal of Clinical Pharmacolo$Y· 
The two year sales of these new single chemical entities and the total 
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hospital and prescription sales by firm have been supplied by the market 
research firm, R. A. Gosselin and Company, Inc. The data on research 
and development personnel are available in Industrial Research 
38 Laboratories .£[£.h!. United States. 
The Gosselin data are based on two annual audits performed by the 
firm, the National Prescripticm Audit and the National Hospital Audit. 
These audits are very much the same as those that were used for 
39 Comanor's study. The National Prescription Audit attempts to measure 
the "retail outflow" of prescriptic:ms. The audit is based on a sample 
of·400 pharmacies which have been chosen to measure the preferences of 
37 . 
Paul de Haen, "Drugs Released for Clinical Use," Journal of 
Clinical Pharmacolegy and New Drugs, 5-10 · (1965-1971). 
38 . . . 
Bowker Associates, Inc., Industrial Research Laboratories of the 
United ,States, 12th and 13th Ed., (Washington, D. C., 1965 and 1970)-.-
39comanar, "The Economics of .Research and Development in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry," pp. 101-104. 
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prescribing physicians. Thus, this sample is supposed .. to reflect the 
disti::ibut,ions of the prescriber, and prescription universe. The sample 
has been chosen so that it is proportionate by geographical location and 
type of retail concern. It was also chosen so that it would represent 
a wide cross f:lection of prescribers. Of the 400 stores selected, 229 or 
,. 
57 percent, collected data on new prescriptions and 171, or 43 percent, 
collected new and refill prescription data. Thus, the sales data that 
have been collected for this study include both new and refill 
40 prescripti,ons. 
The National Hospital Audit is derived from a sample of 60 
"Non-Federal Short Term General Hospitals 11 in the U. S. This sample.is 
statistically supposed to represent the purchasing activity of all 
hospitals in the population of 11Non-Federal Short Term General 
41 Hospitals." . 
There are two main limitations to tl).e data derived from the 
Gosselin audits. First, they do not cover the sales of all drugs in the 
U. S. Notably, they do not include sales to governments and other. 
institutional organizations. Secondly, the National Prescription Audit 
ha$ had a tendency to concentrate on large retail outlets. 42 
40 This is one of the main differences in the data for the present 
study and the data of Comanor's study. Comanor did not have informa-
tion on refill prescriptions, and he had to extrapolate to get estimates 
of refill prescription sales. 
41 · .. · . · .. 
The description of these data is based on the descriptions 
contained in.the forewards of the National Prescription Audit and the 
National Hospital Audit . 
. 
42comanor, i'The Economics of Research and Development in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry," p. 101. 
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The data collecte\i ·from the editiens of Industri.al Research 
Laboratories. of lli United States· is virtually the same as that; col"." 
lected by Comanor. · Two exceptions, however, must be noted. Previous to 
1965, t:he data had been collected and published by the National Academy 
of Sciences/National.Research Ceuncil. The twelfth and thirteenth 
editions were published. by Bowker Associates, Inc. Although it appears 
that.the questionnaire technique and the basic data collected are the 
same, it might be expected that some differences might ariee when the 
compilers are·two different groups. 
The data presented in these volumes list the R and D personnel 
according to whether they are professional or auxiliary, supporUve 
personnel, In addition, the.major research activity of the research 
facility was identified. In many cases firms that; had subsidiaries with 
separate research components were broken into their respective organiza-
tional units. 43 · 
One of· the major problems associated with using these volumes for 
this R and D data was the fact that some firms were included in one of 
the editions.but not the ether. In these cases, a simple method of 
e~trapolation was utilized which incorperated the projected grqwth of 
· research persannel in t4e industry during the period under considera-
tion. As stated previously, it has been estimated that the average 
rate of growth of research persennel in the industry for tl)e period 
1959-1965 was six percent per year, and that this would continue until 
1968. ~-') This was based on the estimate made by the Pharmaceutical 
43 Bowker Associates, Inc., pp. vii-viii. 
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Manufacturers Association for the National Institutes of Health.44 It 
is assumed in this study. that. this ,projectic,m would carry over ,into 1970 
so that a forward or.backward extrapolatioQ. is made based.on this six 
percent rate. Thus, if a firm is listed in the 1965 edition of 
Industrial Research Laboratories and not in the 1970 edition, it is 
assumed that its research inputs increased by 36 percent from 1965 to 
1970. Likewise, if a firm is listed in the 1970 edition but not in the. 
1965, it is assumed that.the number of research personnel is 36 percent 
less in 1965 than in 1970. 
The obvious disadvantage of this approach is that it could not be 
expected that any single firm woul4 adhere to the average rate of change 
in personnel. If this procedure had not . been adopted, . however, the 
~ample of firms in the study would have been greatly reduced. 
McGee has criticized Comanor's use of this type of Rand D 
personnel data for two primary reasons. (1) There are quality dif-
ferences among research and development personnel, and these differences 
may consistently occur among different types and sizes of firms. (2) 
There may also be differences in the quantity of non-human research 
·inputs, and these may consistently vary among different types and sizes 
45 
of firms. These are valid criticisms but insufficient information 
does not allow these factors to be taken into account. 
44 ' 
· . U. S. Department of ¥eiilth, Education, and Welfare; p. 3. 
45 McGee, p. 104. 
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Sample Characteristics 
The sample of ethical drug firms for this study was.chosen on the 
basis that.only firms which introduced at least one new single chemical 
entity during the period 1965-1970 were included, and only U. S. firms 
were included. In addition, the number of firms involved was restricted 
by the availability of data on sales and R and.D inputs. Drug firms 
that merged with other drug firms during tQe time period were excluded 
except for those firms that merged in 1970. If a pharmaceutical firm 
merged with a non-pharmaceutical firm and it appea·red that . the 
pharmaceutical firm retained its ethical pharmaceutical integrity, then 
the firm was included in the sample. 
One of the characteristics of the sample of the R and D activity 
for the 1965-1970 period that must be noted first is the level of the 
R and D output for the industry as a whole. During this period the 
output of new single chemical entities was 96. All of these are not 
included in the final sample for t~e reasons outlined above. 
When this output is compared with Comanor's period ef study before 
the 1962 Drug Amendments, the difference is striking. For the period 
1955-1960 the total number of new single chemical entities was 276. 46 
Thus, since the 1962 Drug Amendments there has been a drastic reduction 
in the innovative output of the ethical drug industry. 
The preceding considerations yielded.· a sample af 31 firms that . is 
essentially non-random. These 31 firms an the average accounted for 75 
percent of the total hospital and prescription sales in the United 
States, including refill prescription sales. Table VI shows the primary 
46 
· Walker, p. 130. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Ethical 
Drug 
Sales 
Firm (000) 
Eli-Lilly $!99,698 
. TABLE·VI 
CHARACTERISTICS ©F 3lFIRM SAMPLE 
FOR 1965-197(1) PERI0D 
· Number 0£ New R and D Activit;I 
Single .Chemical Pr0fessienal- Techn.ical 
Entities R and D Rand D 
1965-1970. Personnel Personnel 
4 789 875 
American Home Products 196,048 
2a. Wyeth 1 422 190 
2b. Ayer st 3 216 221 
Mere~ Shari@ and 
Dehme 156;870 8 752 785 
Smith, Kline and 
French 123,855 2 408 420 
Up john 118,396 5 371 356 
E. R. Squibb 99,506 2 341 370 
Abb0tt 97,460 2 462 384 
Leder le 92,861 3 307 292 
Parke, Davis 88,124 3 147 405 
Pfizer and Reering 87,156 7 174 411 
·.Diversification .. 
(D ) 1 
7.2 
7 .. 5 
8.2 
5.8 
9.3 
4.3 
9.8 
9.8 
8.6 
9.0 
8.8 
..... 
..... 
TABLE VI (Continued) 
-.. 
Ethical- Nuinl>er- of NeW -R:andD Activitl'; 
Drug _ s:i.ngle _Chemical _ :Prof'esstonal " Techilical 
. . . ' 
Sales Entities R and D R-and D _ Diversification 
Firm - (GOG) 1965""'.1970 :Pera(>nnel Personnel - (Dl) ·. 
. ~ - ... -. ~ 
11. G;. D-. Searle $ 65,330 1 152 225 5.8 
12. A. - It. Robins 589310 3 58 49 11.0 
13. Warner-Lamber~ 52,270 2 262 440 9.3 
14. Sterling 50,367 - 3 282 316 9.2 
15. Schering 48,940 4 264 185 7.3-
16. Johnson and Johnson 47,733 
16a. McNeil 3 85 61 8.8 
16b. Ort ha 1 97 97 3.2 
17. Wallace 25,675 1 41 17 6.6 
18. Baxter 25,263 
18a. Hyland 1 31 8 1.0 -
18b. Flint 1 79 64 3.G 
19. Merrell 239686 1 ·134 140 10.0-
20. Norwich 21,898 1 121 200 2.0 
21. Cutter 12,927 1 53 26 2.2 
" 22. Stuart 9,636 1 lG 12 9.0_ GO 
Ethical 
Drug 
Sales 
Firm (000) 
23. Warren-Teed $ 5,651 
24. Allergan. 3,531· 
25. Rowell 1,622 
26. Philips-Roxane 1,284 
27. Central 270 
28. duPont 116 
"' 
TABLE VI (Continued) 
Number of New R and D Activitl 
Single ._Chemical Professional Technical 
Entities R and :a R and D 
1965~1970 Personnel Persennel 
1 . 21 28 
1 23 11 
1 7 8 
1 18 54 
1 3 9 
1 45 132 
Diversification 
(Dl) 
5.0 
3.5 
8.2 
5.3 
8.6 
,8 
·....i 
\C 
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data that is used in the regression analyses that are performed in the 
following chapter. The sample c~ntains realtively mere larger firms 
than.the 57 firm sample of Cemanor where one-third of the firms in his 
J-shaped distribution fell in the smallest size class. This smallest 
class was considered to be.those firms who had sales less than $1 mil-
. . 47 . 
lion which can be considered a rather arbitrary designation. From 
Table VI it appears that the distribution of firms for the 1965-1970 
sample period falls into three distinct class sizes. These class sizes 
are apparent by looking at .the relative size in average sales and at the 
. scale of research and development inputs. 
The smallest class size in the distribution of firms in the present 
study is considered to be firms whose average sales range from $1.0 
million to $26 million. The range of professional R and D inputs for 
this size class is 7 to 134. The average level of sales is $14.2 mil-
lion and the average scale of research inputs is 48.9 for professional 
research personnel. The medium class size is designated as the firms 
whose sales range from $30 million to $66 million and the research 
inputs range from 58 to 282. The average sales for this medium size 
class is $53 million and the average number of professional research 
personnel is 171.4. The large class size is designated as firms whose 
sales range from $85 million to $125 million and whose employment of 
professional research personnel ranges from 147 to 462. The average 
level of sales for this size class is $101.1 million and the average 
number of professional research inputs is 315.7. 
47 Comanor, "The Economics of Research and Development in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry," p. 109. 
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The mean size for the 1965-1976 sample.is $64 million. The·average 
number ef prefessianal research, inputs for the sample is 199.2. 
These size characteristics ef.the 1965-1970 sample are indicative 
ef the type ef impact, that .the 1962 Drug Amendments have had en. the 
·R and D . activity ef the ethical drug industry. Cemparing the present 
·~· 
sample ef f irriis intreducirig new drug innovations wit}:l the 195~-1960 
. . . 
sample, larger firms al;'e new mere predondnant. 
Another striking comparison that can be made between the sample 
of firms fer 1955-1960 and that for 1965-1970 is the difference in the. I , • . 
scale of research and develepment act:l,vity. This is reflected in 
Table VII which cempares this aspect ef ,the present sample with 
Comaner's. 
TABLE VII 
DIFFERENCES IN SCALE OF R AND D ACTIVITY 
. ~ 
BE,TW$EN 1955.:-1960 AND 1965-1970 
Number ef Persannel 
Prefessic:mal R and D - 1955-1960* 
Total R and D - 1955-1960* 
i>rofefil~:l.enal Rand n·- 1965-1970** 
Total R and D - 1965-1970** 
standai;-d 
Mean Deviation Range 
74.7 
158.4 
199.0 
410.0 
112.6 
246.5 
470.9 
407.3 
4.0 - 590.5 
.-· 7. fl' -:~ 1103. 0 
3.0 - 789.0 
12.0 - 1664.0 
Seurces: *William S. Comanar, "The Ecenemics ef Research and Develep-
ment in the Pharmaceutical Industry," (unpub. Ph.D. disserta-
t:l,en, Harvard University, June, 1963), p. 120; **Bowker 
Associates, Inc., Industrial Research Laberateries ef the 
United States, 12th and 13th Ed., (Washingten~ D. c-:-; 1965 and 
1970)~ 
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The magnitude of research and development personnel in 1965-1970 
is considerably greater t.han that of the 1955-1960 period. This is 
noticeable in both professional R and D personnel and total personnel, 
where both are greater than two and one-half times the level in 1955-
1960. 
A final characteristic of the sample of firms for the 1965-1970 
period that must be noted concerns the treatment of firms that had one 
or.more pharmaceutical subsidiaries. The size variable for this situa-
tion is computed as th~·total for all of the pharmaceutical subsidiaries 
of the firm. As an example, American Home Products had three subsid-
iaries that made pharmaceutical sales during the period studied. These 
three subsidiaries were Wyeth, Ayerst, and Ives Laboratories, and their 
sales were combined to get the size variable. This combined sales 
figure is used because it is assumed that the size influences must come 
from all of the pharmaceutical activity of the parent firm. 
Fer this subsidiary situation the R and D output and input 
variables were calculated for each indivi4ual subsidiary. This is based 
on the assumption that the research and development facilities are 
relati,vely autonomous once the size of.the firm has been taken into 
account. Thus, for American Home Products its Wyeth and Ayerst subsid-
iaries had new single chemical entity output during the relevant period 
so that these outputs were counted separately, and they had different 
scales of research facilitie~ as measured by R and D inputs. These 
were also counted separately. 
Utilizing this data base, the model of research and development 
output for the ethical pharmaceutical industry is employed in the next 
chapter to ascertain the impact of the 1962 Drug Amendments on R and D 
in the industry~ In that chapter" appropriate comparisons are made 
with Comanor's study in making the assessment of this impact. 
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The preceding chapter has outlined the basic model of technical 
change and the data that.are used in the present chapter to judge the 
impact of the 1962 Drug Amendments on the R and D activity of the 
pharmaceutical industry. This chapter presents the results of the 
various regression analyses that have been performed to ascertain this 
impact. 
Empirical Results Using 
Comanor's Techniques 
The first analysis which is presented here duplicates Comanor's 
study. Thus, it is assumed that the output of the R and D facility can 
be determined by using the model expressed by equation 4.1. The 
relevant output for this model is the two year sales of new siµgle 
,, 
chemical entities, Y1 • All of the other variables are those outlined 
in Chapter IV. This is the ideal technique, given the significance of 
Cemanor's results, for it allows the most valid comparisons of the two 
time periods.; 
Equation 5.1 represents the estimated relationship using Comanor's 
techniques: 
84 
Y1 = 1.085 - 3.42Ri + .836R~ + .005S - .0131 (-1.289) (1.447) (.499) (-.646) 
85 
- .076D1. (R2 = .159) 
(-.670) 
(5.1) 
The significance of the R2 is judged by the F-ratio test and the signif-
icance of the regression coefficients by one-tailed t-tests which are 
i i..~ d h . ff. . 1 n parent.~ses un er t e regression coe icients. 
·~ 
Based on these tests 
the estimated equation is highly insignificant. The regression coef-
f icients for the variables representing research and development inputs 
do have. signiftcance at the 90 percent confidence level, but on the 
whole the significance of this relationship in explaining the R and D 
output of the drug industry for this time period is not very high. 2 
One comparisen with the Comanor estimates that must be noted deals 
"'":,.,M 
with the signs of the regression coefficients. The coefficients for the 
1965-1970 period take on the same signs as those of the 1955-1960 period 
when the techniques of Comanor's model are duplicated. 
In addition to performing the regression analysis utilizing the 
deflated two year sales of new single chemical entities, Y1 , and the 
number of professional Rand D personnel, R1 , as shown in equation 5.1, 
the total number of R and D personnel was also used as the input 
1As done previously in Table V, the coefficient of determination, 
R2, is underlined so that it will not be confused with the research 
variable, and this will be continued throughout this study. 
2rn this and the follqwing multiple regression estimates the data 
for some of the variables have been scaled so as to express them in the 
same order of magnitude. This is recommended by J. Johnston, 
Econometric Methods (New York, 1963), p. 12, and is necessary to assure 
that there will not be too few significant numbers in some of the est:f.""' 
mates. This is also important because the computer program used would 
only calculate regression coefficients to five significant places. 
Appropriate adjustments will be made to these coefficients in order to 
account for these scaling factors in a later section of this chapter. 
independent variable. With these variables the relationship is also 
highly significant. 
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Based on these estimated equations it is concluded that a ~odel 
with the first two years sales of new single. chemical entities as the 
dependent variable and research inputs, size of firm, the interaction 
between the size of the firm and scale of research inputs, and 
diversification as the independent variables is not statistically 
relevant to the 1965-1970 time period. This conclusion follows from the 
insignificance of the regression coefficients that are reflected in the 
t-values, and from the value of the coefficient of determination as well 
as its F-statistic which measures its significance. The F-value for 
. this.estimated relationship is .9124. 
Empirical Results Using Number of New 
Single Chemical Entities as 
Output Variable 
Output Model Using Revised Techniques 
The regression analysis was also performed when the dependent. 
output variable was expressed as the number of new single chemical 
entities, Y2 , produced by each of the firms during the 1965-1970 time 
period. Both definitions of the R and D inputs are used in conjunction 
with Y2• The other variables in the estimates are the same as those 
used by Comanor and as defined in Chapter IV. In all of these estimates 
the dependent variable and the scale of research and development 
variables. R and R2. are deflated by the size of firm in order to deal 
3 
with the problem of heteroscedasticity. 
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Table VIII presents the estimated regression equations when Y2 is 
the dependent variable. Equations 5.2 - 5.4 are the estimates when R1 
. and D1, D2, and n3 are used respectively. Equations 5.5 - 5. 7 are the 
' . . . 
. . . . 
estimates when R2 and n1, n2 , and n3 are used respectively. As 
done previously, the one-tailed t-test .is used to judge the signif-
icance of the regression coefficients, and the F-ratio test is used to 
judge the significance of the R2• As shown, the t-tests indicate that 
all of the regression coefficients for the model using Y2 and R1 are 
. significant at the 95 percent confidence level with the exception of 
the linear R and D term which is significant at the 99 percent con-
fidence level. The F-ratio indicates that all six of the estimated 
equations are significant at the 99 percent confidence level. The 
F-values for equations 5.2 - 5.7 are 42.53, 43.68, 44:26, 73.65, 74.86, 
3tn Comanor's sample there was a wide range in firm size which made 
him assume there would be a difference in the error terms of the 
various observations, and thus he assumed heteroscedasticity, Comanor, 
"The Economics of Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry," p. 124. The present sample also has a wide range in firm 
size so·that·it is assumed that there is heteroscedasticity. In light 
of this assumption it is also assumed that the error terms of the 
observations have a variance that is proportional to the size of the 
. ftrm as expressed by its total pharma~eutical sales. The const~nt of 
proportionality that.is used to reduce the possibility of heteroscedas-
ticity, then, is the size of the individual firm. It is also assumed 
that the size disturbances would affect both the output variable and the 
scale of research variables so that both are deflated by the size of 
firm. See Pothuri R.aa and Roger LeRoy Miller, Applied Econometrics 
(Belmont, California, 1971), pp. 127-129 and pp. 141-145. To ascertain 
·whether heteroscedasticity might still exist once.the above.transforma-
t~on.is performed. a test.suggested by H. Glezser, "A New Test for 
Hetf:?roskedasticity, 11 Journal of the American Statistical Association, 
64 (March, 1969) 9 pp. 316-323, is employed. Using this test on the 
regressions it appears that "mixed" het~roscedasticity may still exist, 
but an adequate constant of proportionality could·· not be ascertained to 
deal with tqis problem. 
TABLE.VIII 
REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR 1965-1970 
Y2 .;,-.046 + .449-6Ri - .503Ri** -- .oo8s_ ** + .Ol7I** + _.o83D!* -
- (4.349) (-2.237] (-2~210) - (2.212) (1.884) 
Y2 =.-.037 + ._ 318Ri_-_"" .489R2i** - .OOSS** + .0161** + 1.12_ 4D_ ~* 
- (6. 728) (-2.09 (-2.195) (1. 950) (2. 012~ 
- Y2 =-.195 + .321Ri - .534RI** - .009S** + .0201** + .103D 
- (6.789) (-2.256) (-2.488) (2.296) (2.096) 
* 2 Y2 =-.251 + .456Rz - 0 076R * - •. 00058 + .00031.+ .038D1 
- (5.819) (-3.720) (-.190) (.153) (1.196) 
Y2 =-.318 + .443R~ - .072R~* - .0005$ + .000041 + .594D2 (5.491) (-3.402) (-.191) (.058) (1.355) 
Y2 =-.246 + .453R~ - .075R~* - .0004S + .000051 + .060D3 (5.771) (-J~670) (-.161) (.062) (1.605) 
*Indicates statistical significance at 99% confidence level. 
**Indicates statistical significance at 95% confidencelevel. 
(!.2 = .89) (5.2) 
2 cg = .90) (5.3) 
2 (R = .90) (5.4) 
2 (R = .94) (5~5) 
2 (R = .94) (5.6) 
2 (! = .94) (5. 7) 
_Statistical significance for the regression coefficients is determined by one-tailed t-tests, and 
the significance of the R2 by the F-ratio_test. 
The t-values are in parentheses under the regression coefficients. 
00 
00 
and.77.10, respectively. In addition, it must be noted that the a2•s 
for equations 5.2 ... 5.7 are markedly greater than the. !.2 for equation 
5.1 •. 
Based on the significance of the regression coefficients, it is 
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concluded,. that; .the. equt;ltions util:i,zing the number of new single chemical 
. . - . ' ' . ' . . ' ' . 
entities, Y2; as.the output variable and the number of professienal 
research personnel, R1, as the input variable are·the most significant 
relation~hips determining the R and D activity ef the drug industry for 
the· period under investigation. Equations 5.2 - 5.4, based on the test 
criteria; appear to be equally significant. 
The only differentiating feature of equations 5.2 - 5.4 is the 
three .. diversification designations, and all three are . statistically 
significant. It is concluded that all three of the definitions of 
diveraificatien are equally satisfactory. 4 
Using t:he estimated regression equations.5.2 - 5.4, it is 
concluded, then, that a production function type of medel can be 
util-ized to :l.nvestigate the R and D activity of the ethical drug 
··industry for the period 1965-1970. This medel has the number of new 
single chemical entities that a drug firm introduces as its dependent 
output variable. The. independent variables include research personnel 
inp~ts.,. size of firm, the interaction between firm size and scale of 
researchinputs, and diversification • 
. ·4 .. ; . . .···. . . 
These diversification measures when.used by Comanor were also 
·equally sati~factory; Comanor, ''Research and Technical Change in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry," P• 184. Due to the fact that all three. 
de:finitions of diversifieation are significant in both Comcinor's study 
and the present study, the further. use of the regressicm equations for 
additionai au,lysis will use only one of the definitiens--P1• 
90 
. : . . 
The definition of the dependent variable used in·thia.~odel to 
investigate the impact .of ,the i962 Drug Amendment11 is net the exact 
·. smne definition uaed for the 195'5;_1960 period, but .tqe s:imilar.ities' 
should be enough to allow the assessment.of this impact. The difference 
. ' . . 
· in:the def:l;.nitions thl(lt is necessary to make the model statistically 
. . . . . , . ~·: . . : . 
· .. sign:l.f.icant may even be indicative of tl:iis impact. It ,must; .also be 
noted· that the difference in model significance due ta the difference in 
dependent.variable definition may be due ta some.unknown statistical 
. . . s 
Clu•liti,es of thetlio samples involved. 
Using eqtJation 5~2 as the representative relat:l,anship for the R and 
D·01Jtput.ef the ethical drug industry, the first consideration that must 
.be dealt wtth.is t~e signs of the coefficients. The linear R t;Lnd D term 
is J>OStt·ively assacit;Lted with R and.· D output in the drug indu1;1try which 
is .all .!. prior·i, expectation. This_ contrast$ greatly with Comanor' s 
empirical·resuits·which indicated that the linear input;: variable was 
-negatively associated with the output variable. He stated that this 
was incengruous.with the hypathesbed relationship, and he attributed 
...... -
5The regressien estimates t;hat·are presented in TEl,ble VIII are 
based on·the .definitions of the variables cantained in Chapter IV. One 
of.the import;:ant.designations.is the eize of :firm variable which was 
;defined as>r;he sales . of : all the subsidiary units. of a corpe~ate entity, 
whereas the other·variables wet~ measU.red relative t(!) the.ipdividual 
•ubsidiary.unit$. To insure·that·this definition of firm sizewas nat. 
causing anomalous .results, the eize of firm variable was redefined so 
t!:iat it only accounted for .the ,ales of the ~ubsidiary unit of the 
. parent corpora.te .entity •. This did not alter the results significantly. 
The r•gre.iision estimate i>.,aed. on this analysis is contained in the 
Appendix~ · In addition, the estimated results contained in Table VIII 
indicacated that.the residual associat~d with one observation (Central 
Pha~acal) was· relatively qigh. The regression estimates were then run 
with, the removal of this observation. This reduced.the magnitude of the 
yarious regressial) coefficients. The results of these analyses are also 
preae~ted .. in ~he AJ>pendi~. 
it to a statist~cal problem associated with ~av~ng a nwnber of zero 
. valu~s · for the dependent .. variable. 6 
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As shown, the value of the quadratic R and D term is negative, and 
t~ere may be an .!. priori reason to expect this because the production 
functio(l m$Y be subject to decreasing marginal productivity at some 
level of re$earch inputs. Comanor found the term to be positive. 7 
The regression coefficient.of the variable used to denote the size 
. of firm., S, has a negative value. This may be somewhat anomalous in the 
light of . similar. studies which have looked at R and D output and the 
size of firm. Schnee's study of the drug industry looked at the rela-
tionship between the number.of drug innovations, a linear size variable, 
and a quadratic size variable. For tQe period 1950-1962 his regression 
result' are as follows: 
2 nj • .31 + .07S - .0038 , (5.8) 
where nj is the number of innovations for the j th firm and S is the 
size variable. 8 As can be seen the linear size term is positive. 
A similar technique, but one in which a scale of R and D factor is 
incorporated, has been used by Mansfield to study the chemical industry: 
(5. 9) 
Here the size of coefficient has a negative sign, but this is somewhat 
misleeding because the scale of R and D (for his purposes R and D 
expenditures) is a multiplicative factor in front of the parenthesis. 
6 .. ·· . . . 
. Comanor, "Research and .. Technical Change in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry,"· p. 185 • 
. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Schnee, p. 176. 
Thus,. the size of firm variable is multiplied by the scale of research 
which is more like tlle interaction variable of the present study. 9 
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As indicated previously, Comanor stated that a positive sign could 
be expected for the size of .firm vari~ble because this would reflect 
such .things as the firm's distribution facilities, selling effort, and 
reputation. He concluded that firm size in his 1955-1960 period acted 
10 to·increase the gains from technical change. 
This type of conclusion does not seem to apply to the present 
study due to the fact that the Rand D output variables are different. 
In Comanor's study the dollar sales of the new drug innovations were 
used as the dependent variable and these sales could be affected by 
distribution facilities, selling effort, and reputation. It should be 
expected that these factors would not be important when only physical 
Rand D output is considered. 
Given the negative sign of S for the present.study~ it may be that 
this variable reflects the usual negative impact that size alone has 
upon this aspect of a.firm's output. It thus appears that since 1962, 
firm size alone results in decreasing gains to R and D output which 
could be attributed to the usual types of management coordination and 
control probl81lls as these problems arise in connection with the research 
and develGpment of the firm. 
This interpretation can also be seen from the partial correlation 
coefficient which is also negative and has a value of - .404. The 
9 . . 
Mansfield, Industrial Research and Technological Innovation: 
~Econometric Analysis, p. 41. 
10 See pages 64-65. 
93 
partial correlation coefficient.is ·a measure of the proportion of the 
2 
variat:l,on i~ Y2 unaccounted. for by Rl' R1, I, and D that. is explained by 
. 11 the addition of s. 
As an additional check on the Sign of this variable, the simple 
correiat:lon between R: and D output and the size of firm was computed. 
This is.done.to ascertain whether the other variables in the total 
relationship might have rendered the sign negative. The estimated 
relatic;mship is as follows: 
Y2 = 1~01s - .ooss. 
2 <! = .09) (5.10) 
Although the relationship itself is not.statistically significant, the 
negative sign of the· size variable is consistent with the previous.· 
'results. 
The sign of this size variable is the first clue to the impact of 
the 1962 Drug Amendments. Even though the sign of the size variable 
when Comanor's techniques are exactly duplicated is the same as 
Comanor's result, the negative sign that.results when only physical R 
and D output is used as the dependent variable is an important indicator 
of the effects of the amendments on drug innovation. It must be noted 
that.even though the sign of the size coefficient in the present study 
is.negati,.ve and indicates decreasing output.gains, this does not 
necessarily show decreasing returns to.scale as it is used in this 
study. ·.Decreasing or increasing returns for the present study relate to 
the scale of R.and D inputs and size of firm as they affect Rand D 
output. 
11J.h . . 61 
· o nst:on, P• · • 
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Finally, the possibility that the.sign of the size variable is 
incorrect must be considered. This can occur when there are· certain 
unknown qualities of tQe sampling distribution. This usually means tbat 
the regression coefficient is not· statistically dif!erent from zero, but 
wi.th the computed t-value indicating that the coefficient. is signif-
icant at the 95 percent level, there is good reason to accept the value 
. . 12 
of the sign. 
The sign of the interaction variable, I, for the 1965-1970 time 
period is positive. This again differs greatly with the 1955-1960 
period where the value was negative. The negative sign for Comanor's 
I allowed for two competing effects on the Rand D output.of the drug 
firms in.the industry. The size variable alone, in Comanor's study, 
picked up the distributional and promot~onal advantages of large size, 
while the interaction variable would allow for the off setting 
. 13 . disadvantages occurring in.the research facility. 
The sign of the interaction variable of the present study is 
another clue as to the impact of the amendments. In 1955-1960 the 
inefficiencies of large sized firms relating to their R and D facility 
were reflected in the negative sign. For t~e 1965-1970 period it 
appears that certain inefficiencies due to large size have now been to 
a certain degree offset. 
For the present study the negative sign of the size variable may 
reflect the management coordinat;on and control problems that can arise 
when R and D is associated with a large sized firm. On the other hand, 
12 Rao and Miller, p. 46 .. 
13see pages 65-66. 
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the positive sign of the interaction variable, which occurs when both 
designaq,ons of R and D inputs are used, may reflect certain R and D 
facility scale efficiencies. Thus, the positive sign that appears when 
R1 is used may reflect the fact that professional R and D inputs when 
associated with the size of firm exert a positive impact on the.Rand D 
output of the firm. The positive sign that appears when R2 is used may 
reflect the better use of clerical personnel and technicians, computing 
facilities and specialization of labor that occurs within tqe research 
facility and becomes.more important when the size of the firm becomes 
larger and when the scale of the research facility becomes larger. The 
positive sign of the interaction variable may also reflect the fact that 
as both the size of firm and the scale of research activity become 
larger, the.firm is able to attract more capable personnel which 
increases its R and D output, All of the apparent efficiencies that are 
indicated above are directly related to the provisions of the new drug 
regulations. 
The sign of the diversification variable as shown in Table VIII is 
posit~ve when each of the three definitions.is used. To Comanor the 
negative sign of this coefficient in his study indicated that the out-
put of the drug firm would be greater when the firm concentrated its 
I 
research effort in a few areas. Given the significance of the variable 
for the present study, .the positive sign may indicate that the research 
effort must be spread.over a wider area of product categories in order 
for it to find a marketable new drug product. This sign change could 
also reflect an effect of the amendments on the R and D effort of the 
industry. Because of the proof of efficacy requirement for all types of 
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drugs, as discussed in Chapter III, the firm may now have to extend its 
research activity into many areas in order for it to develop a.new drug 
which will be approved by the FDA for introduction on the market. This 
would have the tendency of invo+ving the.firm in several markets and 
thus diversifying the R and D activitie~ of the firm. 
T~e observed signs of the vatiables for the present study are 
offered as preliminary evidence as to the impact of .the 1962 Drug 
Amendments on the Rand D actLvity of the drug indu~try,for the 1965-
1970 time period. The estimated relation given in equation 5.2 will now 
be used to il!-vestigate the major.aspect.of this study. 
Scale Econ0111ies and the Use of Supporting 
Personnel in Drug R and,D 
Equation 5~2 expresses the estimated relationship between the 
research and development output of drug firms for the period 1965-1970 
·and the.se firm's Rand D inputs, their size, their .. interacti,on with size 
and personnel inputs, and their degree of diversificatio~. For com~ 
putational expediency the variables in th,is relationship were scaled to 
obtain these estimates. Scal~ng of variables in.an estimated relation-
ship does.not e~fect the significance.of the regression coefficients 
that are obtained; but it does affect the values of the regression 
. 14 
coefficients themselves. It is necessary to take into account these 
14 ' . 
E.g., if it is assumed that a three variable linear model has 
been estimated thusly, 
(5.a) 
then the estimated regre~sion coefficient for the ind~pendent variable 
x1 is c~~puted in this model by: 
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scaling factors to get the true magnitude of the regre~sion coefficients 
that are shown in equation 5,2. This is especially n~cess~ry for the 
present study because the,values of the r~greesion coefficients are used. 
to determine R and D marginal productivity and outpu~ elasticity that 
exists for drug firms for the 1965-1970 time period. When the scaling 
factors.are accounted for, the ti;ue expression of equation 5.2 is: 
Y = - 3.568 x 10-5 + .0449~R - 5.032 x l0-4R2 - 8.05 x l0-9s 
+ 1.731 x 10-llR•S + 8.3 x ·10-5 .(5.1~ 
Comanor used the regression coefficients from his 1955-1960 sample 
to . explare wqat ,, he termed. the "economies of scale" of drug R and D. The 
smne technique is used in the.present study to look·at drug Rand D but 
the implications of the technique do not n~cessar:J.ly reflect economiee 
of scale as the term is generally u~ed in the theory of prodµction •. 
(5.b) 
where the variables in equation 5.b are expressed.in deyiation form •. 
However, if .the variables have been scaled for computational expediency, 
-it is· necessary to-adjust the r~gre§sion coe:eficients derived.fromequa..,. 
tion 5. b so th.at the trlcle value of B 'can be dete:i;-mined. Thus, if the 
scale factors of k1 , k2, and k . are used on Y, x1, and x2 respectively, · 
then ·it _is nec;essaTy to make. a~juetl!ents for these scale factors. The 
mathematics of this adjustment for :a is shown-in equationa. 5.c, 5~d, and 
5.e: ' . 2 
B ·= (Ek!yk2x.1)[ECx2~3.~.)_i~ o:k1y_k3x2 )_(k2xlk~x2 )_. 
1 [E Cx1 k2 )J L·E (k21t3) J - E (k.2x1 k3x2) 
klk2k;[cEyk;i.)(E,x~) ~ CE,rx2HEx1x2>J . 
B = .....-.--------~---........ ---........ __....-..~~ ........ --~ k~k3 ( (txi) (E~~)· - Ctx1x2) 2) .. (5.d) 
R1 (CEyx1)(rx;) :-- o:yx2)(Ex1x 2)] B = ................................ ..,,..... ................................ ------........ ~ ........ k2 [CExi)(Ex~) - (Ex~x2 >2J 
The true value of the regres.sion coefficient is then expressed as: 
Bl = B1k2 
kl • (5.f) 
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When the deflation factor is taken into consideration, equation 
5.11 can be expressed as: 
Y/S = - 3.568 x 10-5 + .04496R/S - 5.032 x l0-4R2/8 
- 8.05 x 10-98 + 1.731 x 10-11R·8 + 8.3 x 10-5D. (5.12) 
Multiplying both sides of equation 5 ·.~2. by 8 yields the following: 
Y = - 3.568 x 10-58 + .04496R - 5.032 x l0-4R2 - 8.05 x 10-982 
Rearranging equation 5.13 it can be.expressed as: 
-5 y = ~ 3.568 x 10 ~ - 8.05 x 10-982 + 8.3 x 10-5D·8, 
(5 .13) 
+ (.04496 + 1.731 x l0-1182)R 
(5.14) 
Using equation 5.14 it is possible to obtain values for a, b, and c as 
originally indicated by equation .4.3 in Chapter IV: 
a = - 3.568 x 10-58 - 8 •. 05 x 10-982 + 8.3 x l0-5D·8 
b = .04496 + 1.731 x 10-1182 
-4 
c = - 5.032 x 10 • 
(S.15) 
(5.16) 
(5.17) 
Using the.general form for the marginal productivity of research 
and development;:, as indicated in equation 4. 4 in Chapter IV, it is pos..,. 
sible to express the marginal productivity for the 1965-1970 period as: 
ay/aR = .04496 + 1.731 x lo-1182 - 2c5.032 x lo-4)R. (5.18) 
In this estimat.ed relationship b is positively. related to 8 and 2cR is 
negative so that the value of ay/aR is determined by the relative values 
of b and 2cR. Given the firms that appear in the 1965-1970 sample, the 
value of 2cR is absolutely larger than b and the value of ay/aR is 
always negative. 
Thus, during the 1965-1970 period the marginal productivity of 
research and development personnel is negative. This is a striking 
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result and.it supports Hypothesis 1 which stated ,that.the 1962 Drug 
.Amendments would cause the marginal productivity of prof~ssional R and D 
personnel to become negative. This contrasts.to the results for the. 
1955-1960 period, where Comanor found the marginal produ~tivity of R and 
D personnel to be positive, but the relationship was such that ay/aR was 
15 inversely.related to S, and it was only at-very large values that the. 
' 16 
marginal productivity of-Rand D personnel inputs would be negative. 
In order to investigate the implications. of this marginal 
produ~tivity relat~onship, the sizes of the firms in the present s~ple 
are classified into three arbitrary class sizes. These class sizes 
are chos~n on the basis .of Table VI in Chapter IV. From this tabl,e it .. 
appears there are three class sizes of.firms in the 1965-1970 time 
perioq which ar~ classified as small, medium, and large. The small 
class size includes firms whose-sales are·in the r~nge of $1 - $26 
million. The medium size class includes firms whose.sales range from 
$30 - $66 million, and the large class size includes firms in the.$85 -
$125 million s~les range. In addition .the size range for tQe total 
sample of firms is $166 thousand to $200 million. Thos~. firms that fell 
wit.bin these class ranges . formed the basis for computin~ the marginal, 
productivity for each class. The value fot: Sis computed as the average. 
size of all the.firms that fell within a particular class range. Thus, 
the S value for the small class is $14.2 million, for the .medium class 
15 ' 
See page 60, 
16 ' Comanor, "Research and Technical Change in the.Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 11 .p. 188. 
$53.9 million and for the large class $101~1 million,17 The average 
value for the total sample is $64,0 million. 
Average values for R1 are calculated in a similar manner. The 
values for R1 are 48.9, 171.4, and 315.7 for small, medium, and large 
firms, respectively. The value for the total sample is 199.2. 
Using these computations and equations 5.15, the marginal, 
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productivity of R.and D inputs for the.three class sizes and the total 
sample were calculated. For small firms the marginal productivity is 
- .00075; for medium firms the marginal productivity is - .079; an~, for 
large firms the marginal productivity is - .09601. The marginal 
productivity of research personnel.for the total sample is - .08195. 
The negative marginal productivity for R and D personnel inputs for 
the 1965-1970 period is an important implication concerning the impact 
of the 1962 Drug Amendments on the output of new.single chemical 
entitie.s. Whereas all firm sizes had marginal productivities that were 
positive for the 1955-1960 period, these appear to have been rendered 
negative since 1962. 18 
17The class intervals that have been chosen for the present study 
are larger than those selected by Comanor. These larger class sizes are 
based on the nat~ral size breaks that appear in Table VI and they should 
account for growth in.the industry. Comanor's size class.ranges are the 
following: small, S = $1 million, R1 = 13.1; medium, S = $10 million, 
R1 .., 59.2; large, S = $50 millien-, R1 = 353.3. Comanor, "Research and 
Technical Change in the Pharmaceutical Ind1..1,stry, 11 pp. 187-188. 
18 As pointed out previously, the regression estimates were also 
calculated where the size of th~ firm was measured as the size of the 
individual subsidiary unit as opposed to the size of the.total pharma-
ceutical corporate entity. The marginal productivity calculations were 
also made based on these regression estimates, and the values of t4ese 
marginal productivities were not significantly affected. These results 
are presented in the Appendix. However, the marginal productivity 
calculations.were also computed .on the basis of the regression estimates 
where the high residual obse·rvation (Central Pharmacal) was removed. 
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The implications of these amendments on marginal productivity can 
be evaluated further by looking at the maximum or minimum character-
is tics of the d.rug output relationship. The general relationship for 
drug R and D output was expressed in equation 4.3.. Given the values for 
a, b, and c that are derived from the estimated relationship in equation 
5.14 and are expressed in equations 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17, this general 
expression becomes: 
2 Y = a + bR - cR • (5.19) 
To test whether this function has a maximum or minimum it is necessary 
to take the first derivative with respect to R and set this equal to 
zero which determines the critical value. 
·~· 
@Y/@R = b - 2cR, 
•@;= b - 2cR, 
- 2cR = - b, 
R = b/2c (critical value). 
(5.20) 
(5.21) 
(5.22) 
(5.23) 
The functional relationship reaches a maximum if for the critical value 
the second derivative with respect to R is less than zero. The second 
derivative of equation 5.19 is: 
o2Y/'dR2 = - 2c. (5.24) 
This means that equation 5.19 reaches a maximum at.a level 0f research 
and devel0;pment personnel,that is equal to the.critical value expressed 
in equation 5.23. 
This had the effect of causing the values of the marginal pr~ductivities 
f0r large and medium firms to be relatively the same as previous calcu~ 
lat ions. It did cause th.e marginal praductivity for small. firms t0 
bec0me positive, but its value is very cl0se to zero. These calcula-
tions are also presented in the Appendix. 
10;2 
' 
· ~· In order to compare these critical values within the actual levels 
of R and D personnel, the critical values for each of the class sizes 
of firms for the 1965-1970 sample period have been calculated. For 
small firms the critical R is 48.1 and the average ~tual value of R for 
this class size is 48.9. For medium sized firms the critical R is 92.9 
where the average actual value is 171.4. Firms in the large sized class 
have a critical R of 220.3 compared with an actual average of R equal to 
315.7. 
Figure 3 graphically illustrates the .relative differences between 
these critical values and the actual average values for the three size 
classes of firms. Point A is the actual average for small firms,.and 
point B is the computed critical value. Point C is the actual average 
for medium firms and D represents the computed critical value. Point E 
is the actual average value of R for large forms and point F represents 
the.criti,cal value for large firms. 
The R and D production function that is used here implicitly 
assumes that.Rand D personnel are the variable input which is being 
applied to a fixed factor of production. These results imply, then, 
that all sizes of drug firms are operating in Stage III of the stages 
of producti0n when Rand D personnel are the variable input. (Small 
firms are operating fairly close to Stage II, however.) This means that 
these firms are using too m~ny professional R and D personnel such that 
their use is not profit maximizing. Thus, it may be that the 1962 Drug 
Amendments have forced drug firms to over-utilize professional R and D 
personnel at the expense of using them in a profit maximizing manner. 
~ . 
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In addition, since there is synnnetry in the stages of production, this 
means that the fixed factor of production is under-utilized. 19 
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At first glance these marginal productivity computations suggest 
that, during the 1965-1970 period, small firms may be better at judging 
the profit maximizing level of R and D inputs for they are much cioser 
to the critical value as it is expressed in,equation 5.23. It appears 
that medium and large sized firms are much further away from this 
critical value of professional R and D personnel, and thus have not been 
as successful at determining the prof it maximizing level of these 
inputs. 
However, these conclusions may be misleading for several reasons. 
(1) The production function that.is used to measure the Rand D output 
of the drug industry is one in which there is only one.variable input, 
20 R, and it really reflects variable proportio~s. In conjunction with 
this, the relationship may not be expressing the complementarity of R 
and D inputs with the other factors of production within the.firm, and 
the output of new single chemical entities does not.express the true 
output of R and D personnel when these personnel may be involved in the 
production processes ef the firm. 
(2) As indicated abeve, new single chemical entities may not. 
reflect the true R and D eutput of drug firms, In addition to the 
"output",that.R and D personnel may contribute to the production 
processes of the firm, they may also produce new product forms which may 
have economic significance, These new product forms may be new dosages 
or new forms such as an injection as opposed to a tablet or capsule. 
(3) The output .of drug research in this study is measured as the 
number of new single chemical entities as opposed to the dollar sales 
20 McGee, p. 105. 
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of new single chemical entities for sQme·specified period of time. A 
two year count of the dollar sales of new single chemical entities would 
more adequately account.for tl;ieir economic .impact·as indicat:ed in 
Comanor's study. Not using the first two year sales of new single 
chemical entities as the output variable may have rendered the.marginal 
productivities of:the tl:iree class size.s negative. 
To show the importance of the i~itial two year sales of the new 
single chemical entities for the 1965-1970 period, Table IX shows the 
average.first two year .sales of the new sin~le chemical entities ef the 
three class sizes of firms for the 1965-1970 time period. As shown in 
thi~ tab+e, the economic significance of the new single chemical 
entities is greater for medium and large firms than it is for small drug 
firms. The increased economic significance is not accounted for by 
merely counting the number of new single chemical entities. 
(4) Table IX may also be indicative of tl:ie idea that medium and 
large sized firms only introduced.new drugs that.have economic. 
significance. These firms do not market new drugs unless the economic 
impact of these.new drugs is substantial. Large firms with large 
investments in research and developmen~ and marketing may not introduce 
new single chemical ent~t:f.es unless the anticipated marginal revenues 
of these products is large enough t~ cover the marginal costs of .these 
activities as well as their.productiqn costs. On the other hand, small 
firms with more modest R and D and marketing cost~ will be more willing 
to market any new product of their Rand D effort. Although it.cannet 
be substantiated here, it may be that the economic significance of new 
single chemical entities reflects their.medical significance, and 
thus, medium and large firms are introducing the more significant.new 
•;1 
21 drugs. 
Firm Size Class 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
TABLE IX 
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF NEW 
SINGLE CHEMICAL ENTITIES 
Average First Two Year Sales 
of New Single Chemical 
Entities 
(000) 
$2,384 
4,810 
467 
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(5) Given that medium and large sized firms are substantially above 
the critical level of professional R and D inputs as indicated above, 
this may reflect the idea that these firms have found it necessary to 
use these highly trained personnel to comply with the requirements of 
tbe amendments. This would indicate that the amendments have substan-
ially raised the costs of doing drug research without increasing the 
flow of new drug output. 
21 As ind;l..cated in Chapter II, some economists feel that the 
economic significance of new drugs is primarily a result of the exten-
sive promotional activity on tbe part of large firms. 
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Utilizing the preceding estimated regressioh equations and tbe 
three class sizes of drug firms, it is possible to compute the elas-
ticity of Rand D output with respect.to professional Rand D personnel. 
This elasticity is represented by (qY/aR)(R/Y). The numerical value for 
ay/aR can be calculated by using equation 5~18, and a numerical value 
for Y is obtained by using equation 5.14. 
For small firms the elasticity of Rand D output is - .01478; for 
medium sized firms the elastic:i,.ty is -;2.1743; and> for large firms the 
elasticity is -5.6894. These elisticity measures indicate the percent-
age by whic4 R and D output will increase or decrease when there is a 
22 
one percent increase in R and D inputs. 
The above elasticity measures are. somewhat misleading because the 
Y values that are comput;ed fr0m equatioI). 5.14 do not reflect the actual 
average level af Y for this time period. The value of Y for small firms 
when equation 5.14 is used is 5.3 times the actual average value for tQe 
period. If the actual average value of 1 is used for this class size, 
the elasticity is - .03668 which is 148 percent greater than the value 
when Y is computed in equation 5;14, For medium sized firms the actual 
average value of Y is 2.4 compared to the Y qbtained from equation 5.14 
which is 8.117, and the elasticity is.- 5.575. For large firms the 
actual average value of Y is 3.4 compared to the Gomputed Y of 8.933, 
and tl:le elasticity when the actual value is used is - 8.841. 
Comanor used the elasticity measures as an indication of the 
economies or diseconomies of scale that exist within the research and 
22 " The' S:lasticity measurements were also computed with the 
alternative subsidiary definition and with the high residual observation 
removed. · These elasticities are presented in the Appendix. 
development facilities of drug firms. Comanor's use of the term 
23 
economies of scale has.been brought into question by McGee. As the 
term is usually used, all inputs are variable and a proportionate 
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increase in all of these inputs results in a greater than proportionate 
increase in output. As discussed previously, Comanor was really dealing 
with the question of variable proportions because not all inputs were 
variable in his method; only one input was variable--research and 
development persannel. 
The elasticity measure that was used by Comanor and is used in the 
present study is.really an expression of the output elasticity of an 
input which is the input's marginal product divided by its average 
product. Thus, the elasticity mea~ures computed above are the output 
elasticities of professional R and D personnel. 
The preceding empirical results indicate that Hypothesis 1 is 
supported which means that t4e marginal productivity of professional 
R.and D personnel has become negative since the passage of the 1962 
Drug Amendments. In addition, these results were elaborated on by 
looking at the output elasticities of these R and D inputs. 
These elasticity measures do not reflect the economies of scale 
that exist in the Rand D components of drug firms. In order to get.an 
idea of the scale economies that might appear in these facilities it 
woul4 be necessary to have estimates of the capital and other f aceors 
of production used in these components and this data is not available. 
The above results concerning the marginal productivity and 
't1"', 
elasticity of output of Rand D inputs indicate the.severe impact 
23 . 
See page 61. 
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the 1962 Drug Amendments have had upon the research and development 
activity of the ethical pharmaceutical industry. It is very likely that 
these amendments have caused drug firms to expand their R and D 
components so as to meet the requirements of the amendments, and this 
has had a negative impact on their output of new single chemical 
entities. The previous results are based on R and D output bei~g 
measured as new single chemical entities. This is a somewhat limiting 
definition of R and D output and if a more comprehensive measure were 
' j. 
employed, the results may be significantly different. 
If the limitations of the output measure that.is used in the 
present study are ignored, it .also appears that the amendments have made 
it more difficult for drug firms to achieve the profit maximizing level 
of their R and D inputs. This is especially apparent with medium and 
large sized firms. However, it should be kept in mind that.medium and 
large firms introduced new single chemical entities that had more 
economic significance. 
Since it is not possible to measure the economies of scale of drug 
R and D directly, it is necessary to use more implicit means of dealing 
with this issue. There are two primary indicators that relate to scale 
economies in drug and research development. 
The first indication .of the effects of the amendments on scale 
economies during the .1965-1970 period is shown in the regression 
estimates from the previous section.. Hypothesis 2 expressed the view 
that.the amendments have affected the industry to such an extent that 
the interaction between the size of the firm and its scale of.research. 
now exerts a pesitive influence on the R and D output ef the industry. 
Rejecting or not rejecting this hypothesis yields another indication 
of the impact of the amendments on R and D scale economies. 
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Equation 5.2 shows that the sign of the interaction variable, I, 
is indeed positive for the period of the present study. Thus, Hypoth-
esis 2 cannot be rejected. The implication of this positive sign for 
the interaction variable is that as. the size of the firm increases in 
conjunction with its scale of R and D facility, for which R serves as 
a surrogate, the firm can experience efficiencies which previously were 
not available. The types of economies that can be obtained are the same 
as those discussed in Chapter III. Greater division of labor, utiliza-
tion of computers, and larger laboratories and laboratory equipment are 
all among the scale economies available as the firm increases in size. 
The most important scale economy was mentioned in the previous 
section concerning the interpretation of the signs of the variables. 24 
There it was pointed out that the inefficiencies of large size could 
now be off set by the efficiencies of using clerical personnel and tech-
nicians to adhere to the requirements of the amendments. Thus, support-
ing personnel have become much more important in the R and D process of 
the drug industry. And, it may be that many of the scale advantages 
that large size yields come from the use of supporting personnel in 
complying with new drug regulations. This is the essence of Hypothesis 
3 which states that supporting personnel relative to professional R and 
D personnel now make a significant contribution to the research output 
of the drug firm and thus allow larger firms some scale economy 
benefits. 
24 Refer to pages 94-95. 
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To test the impartance of these supporting personnel, the 
regression estimates were .computed again using an additional var.iable · 
'-i· 
calculated as the ratio of supporting R and D personnel to professional 
R and.D personnel. This variable was calculated on the basis of .the 
average number.of each type of personnel for 1965 and 1970--the.twa 
years the data were available in Industr!al Research Laboratories of ~ 
United States. Table X presents the results of these regression 
estimates with the sixth dependent variable, -the r~tio of supporting 
personnel to professional personnel being added. This added variable is 
represented by the symbol T/P, indicating the designated ratio. 
Table X shows that, using the t-test to juqge the significance of 
the regression coefficients, all of the caefficients are significant. 
at the 95 percent leyel of confidence when the R an4 D input variable, 
Ri• is used. The one exception to this. is the diversification variable 
tha~ in all three cases is only significant at a 90 percent confidence 
level. When R2 is used as the input variable, only the two R and D 
input.variables are significant. 
2 The F-ratio test is utilized to test the significance of the R , 
and in all six estimated eq~ati~n~ this indicates a significance at a 
99 percent confidence level. Based on.the t~tests of .the regression 
coefficients and the F-ratios, it is concluded that the.model is most 
significant when the professional R and D input variable is used. 
In addition to these tests, the simple correlation coefficient.for 
the dependent variable and this measure of the ratio of supporting to 
professional personnel can be important.in depicting the importance,of 
this added varil!J.ble. For equations 5.25 - 5.30 these coefficients are 
.92, .92, .92,, .94,. .94,. and .94.respectively. 
TABLE X 
REGRESSION ESTIMATES WITH SUPPORTING 
PERS~EL 1965-1970 
y2 = - .327 + .367R~ - .366Rt** - .007S** + .014I** + .015Dt* + .370T/P** 
(3.683) (-1.728 (-2.012) (1.940) (1.208) (2.496) 
Y2 = - .322 + .276Ri - .374Rt* - .007S** + .014* ** + .745D2 + .362T/P** (5.953) (-1.719 (-2.062) (1.801) (1.406) (2.499) 
Y2 = - .166 + .278Ri - .406Rt** - .008S** + .016I** + .069D3 + .358T/P** (5.986) (-1.830 (-2.250) (2.030) (1.478) (2.476) 
Y2 = - .251 + .455R~ - .076R~** - .0005S + .0003I + .038Dg + .003T/P (4.349) (-2.899) (-.187) (1.48) (1.10 ) (.019) 
Y2 = - .329 +.435R~ - .070R~** - .0005S + .00005I + .584D2 + .019T/P (4.130) (-2.646) (-.203) (.068) (1.281) (.119) 
Y2 = - .242 + .456R~ - .076R~** - .0004S + .00004I + .060D3 + .006T/P (4.354) (-2.889 (-.149) (.057) (1.527) (-.040) 
*Indicates statistical significance at 99% confidence level. 
**Indicates statistical ~ignificance at 95% confidence level. 
2 (R = .92) (5.25) 
(£.2 = • 92) (5.26) 
2 cg = .92) (5. 27) 
2 (R = .94) (5.28) 
2 (R = .94) (5. 29) 
2 cg = .94) (5. 30) 
Statistical significance for the regression coefficients is determined by one-tailed t-tests, and the 
significance of the !_2 by the F-ratio test. 
The t-values are in parentheses under the regression coefficients. 
I-' . 
I-' 
N 
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Using equations 5,25 - 5.30 and incorporating the language of 
hypothesis testing, it is possible to deal with Hypothesis 3. The nu'll 
hypothesis would be that.supporting personnel relative to professional 
research personnel during ,the 1965-1970 peried fil net make a signif-
icant contribution to the R and D output of the firms in the drug 
~ 
industry. In addition, the use of these supporting petsonnel leads to 
scale economies. The alternative hypothesis is the rejection of the 
null hypothesis. The appropriate test criteria for this hypothesis are 
the t-test .on the regression coefficient T/~ and the simple correlation 
coefficient between new single chemical entity output and the ratio of 
supporting to professional personnel. As indicated in Table IX, this 
regression coefficient is always positive and significant at the 95 
25 pe~cent confidence level for all three equations. In addition, all of 
the simple correlation coefficients are very high. The null hypothesis 
is then rejected. 
Based on this hypothesis testing, it is concluded that since the 
passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments supporting personnel have played a 
very important part in the research effort of the drug industry. It is 
the importance of these supportive personnel that indicates the most 
important scale economy available to firms in the industry. The 
,:;:. 
increased record keeping and reporting procedures as required by the new 
drug regulations may have made it.such that these support:f.ng personnel 
are now very important to the R and D output of the industry. It is 
likely that the larger firms in the industry will be more capable of 
25comanor found this variable to be always negative with no 
statistical significance, Comanor, "Research and Technical Change in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry," p. 189. 
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establishing specializatio~ and division of labor for these supporting 
personnel which may allow them to take fuller advantage of these scale 
economies. 
An additional aspect of these results must be entered. For the 
1955-1~60 period Comanor ccmcl,.uded that the ,insignificance of the 
regression estimates when total Rand D personnel, R2, was used.was an 
additional indication that supporting personnel do not increase the 
26 productivity of professional personnel. With the present study R1 
appear$ to be the better input measure, but R2 still renders the 
estimates significant, according to the F-ratios, so that this adds 
weight to the importance of supporting personnel relative to the 
professional R and D inputs. 
This section attempts to ascertain the existence and types of 
scale economies that might,prevail in the Rand D activity of the 
ethical drug industry since the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments. 
Comaner relied on his elasticity measures to make certain conclusions 
about these scale economies, but due to conceptual inconsistencies these 
elasticity measures are not used in the present study to judge scale 
economies. 
The marginal productivity and output elasticity of R and D inputs 
for the present st4dy do not indi~ate the tremendous impact the amend-
ments have had upon the output of new single chemical entities. The 
marginal product of R and D personnel associat~d with the output of new 
single chemical entities has been rendered negative since the passage 
of the 1962 Drug Amendments •. 
26Ibid. 
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The primary indicators of the scale economies of research and 
development that might.exist since the passage of the amendments are the 
sign of t~e interaction variabl~ and the significance of the ratio of 
supporting to professional personnel. The sign of t~e interaction 
variabl~ is now positive which may indicate that efficiencies may be 
gained when both the size of the firm and the scale of R and D activity 
increase. The importance of the ratio of technical to professional 
personnel may indicate the kinds of scale advantages that can.be 
obtained as a firm and its research facility become larger. 
The 'preceding factors are offered as the primary evidence in 
looking at one of the most important.aspects of this study--the impact 
the 1962 Drug Amendments have had on the economies of scale in research 
in the drug industry. It appears that in carrying on research in the 
1965-1970 time period, size (as it relates to the firm itself and to the 
scale of.Rand D within the firm) has given rise to certain efficiencies 
that were not available in the 1955-1960 period. 
R and D Output Determining R and D Inputs 
The preceding sections of this chapter have indicated that the 
relationship between the size of .the firm and its scale of Rand D 
inputs yields some distinct advantages in the research and development 
productivity of drug firms. One of the implications of these size and 
R and D scale advantages is that it may be that it is now the R and D 
output of the drug firm which allows it to expand its R and D ":fac:l:lities. 
~¥ .. 
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According to Comanor's results, this was not the case during the period 
· prior . to ·the 1962 Drug Amendments. 27 
It fa ·anticipated that this type of change ha~ occurred since the 
passage of the amendments primarily because of the entry barriers that 
at"e apparent.with the increased strictures of these amendments. The 
scale economies in Rand D that were considered in the previous,section 
indicate that there is a cost disadvantage to smaller firms engaged in 
this activity. This entry barrier is ·~oupled with the entry barrier of 
the drug patent which it appears may become more.important as the size 
of firm increases. This follows because larger.firms may be more 
successful at developing new products that provide them with greater 
monopoly power. 
There is evidence that these entry _barrier aspects do prevail since. 
the passage of the amendments. Even though small firms have been able 
to enter with new products during the 1965-1970 period, the economi<;: 
significance of these products is substantially less than that of larger 
firms. As shown in Table IX, the economic significance of new single. 
chemical entities is significantly greater for medium and large firms. 
As discussed previously, this economic significance is determined from 
... 
the first two year sales of new p:oducts and this may or may not be 
28 greatly affected by promot~onal effort. However, since only two year 
sales are counted, these sales should reflect some.of the medical 
significance.of these new drugs as it should take some time before the 
promotional impact.can significantly affect sales. 
27Ibid., P• 188. 
28Ibid., P• 183. 
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Small firms are faced with two difficulties. First, there are the, 
cost disadvantages that appear t() be caused by the 1962 Drug Amendments. 
Second, these firms must enter any new product from their R and D 
activity with the expectation of recovering as much of their R and D 
outlays as possible, and these products may not be of enough medical 
import~nce to establish a preferred market position.. On the other hand, 
large firms can concentrate on more medically and/or economically 
important products which allows them to recover their more substantial 
, :resea:rch and development outlays. 
Thus, it .is expected that since the passage of the 1962 Drug 
Amendments, a cycle ~h~t feeds upon itself has been set in motion. As 
size of firm and R and D intensity (measured by scale cbf R and D inputs) 
' 
increase, this generates new patented products which m~y have more 
medical and/or economic significance. These factors could establish 
effective entry barriers that increase the revenues of the firm and 
1-'; 
possibly its prof,:l.tability. This increased profitability then allows 
' 'I·~. ' 
'· 
firms to increase their expenditures on R and D. All of these factors 
highlight the defensive nature of the Rand D competition of the 
industry that was discussed in Chapter II. From these considerations, 
it is felt that since the passage of the amendments the structure of 
the industry has been altered to the extent that not only.is Rand D 
output deterpiined by Rand D inputs, but R and.D inputs are dependent 
upon Rand D output • 
. T~ investigate this possibility, two basic lead-lag relationships 
are utilized. The first one is one in which the R and D inputs lead the 
Rand D output of the industry. The same· input-output model is used and 
an arbitrary period for the R and D output is selected--this being the 
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period 1968-1970. The. number of new single chemical entities produced 
by firms during this period fo~s the basis of the sample for the 
-. "( 
dependent variable. The scale of research inputs is the.number of 
professional personnel the firms had in 1965. Thus, the R and D inputs 
would lead the output, and this is the relationship consistent with the 
29 
original determination of the research activity of the industry. 
The second relationship investigated is one in which the R and D 
output leads the scale.of the research effort. Again, the basic model 
is utilized, and the output for the industry is the number of new single 
chemical entities produced by firms during the period 1965-1967 and 
represents the relevant dependent variable. The primary independent 
variable, R1 , is the number of professional personnel the firms had in 
1970. This relationship is consistent with the idea it is the output 
that allows firms to increase their R and D inputs. 
The other independent variables of the model are compatible with 
the pr·evious regression estimates, where S is still the average sales 
of the firms for the five year period. For consistency I incorporates 
the R1 relevant to the lead-lag relat~onship, and n1 is based.on the 
time period of the lead-lag dependent variable. 
If the second relationship where output leads the R and D inputs 
is found to be significant, this would indicate another meaningful 
impact of the 1962 Drug Amendments, and it allows the treatment of 
Hypothesis 4, Table XI presents the regression estimates for the 
"' 
relationships discussed above. 
29Ibid., p. 188. 
TABLE XI 
LEAD-LAG RELATIONSHIPS FOR 1965-1970 
(1968-1970) (1965) 
Y2 = - .007 + .525Rf* - .157Ri** - .OOlS + .0031 + .009D (1.788) (-2.253) (-1.224) (1.440) (.922) 
(1965-1967) 
* 2 Y2 = .410 + .448R1 - .525R1* - .012S* + .0221 + .058D1 (4.978) (-2.439) (-2.620) (2.587) (.794) 
*Indicates statistical significance at 99% confidence level. 
**Indicates statistical significance at 95% confidence level. 
2 (R = .47) (5.31) 
2 cg = .91) (5.32) 
Statistical significance for the regression coefficients is determined by one-tailed t-tests, and 
the significance of the R2 by the F-ratio test. 
The t-values are in parentheses under the regression coefficients. 
.... 
.... 
'° 
120 
Equation 5.31 represents the first relationship where R and D 
inputs lead output, and equation 5.32 represents the second relationship 
where output leads inputs. Again, one7tailed t~tests are utilized to 
test the significance of the regression coefficients and the F-ratio 
2 to test the significance of the.R. In equation 5.31 the R1 input, 
variables are the only variables significant at an acceptable level--the 
95 percent level. The F-ratio indicates the R2 is not!significant at an 
acceptable level. 
In equation 5.32 the t-test indicates that the linear input 
variable, the size variable, and the interaction variable are signif.,.. 
icant at .the 99 percent confidence level. The quadratic input term is 
significant.at the 95 percent level. The diversification variable is 
not significant at an acceptable level. The F-ratio te~t indicates that 
2 the ! is significant at the 99 percent .. confidence level. The signs of 
the variables are consist~nt with the results of t~e previous regression 
estimates. 
Based on the~e estimat.es it is nqw possible to deal with Hypothesis 
4. The null hypothesis could state that since the passage of the 1962 
Drug Amendments, Rand D output does not,determine the.scale of research 
inputs. This is because as the size of the firm and its scale of 
research activity increase this~~ contribute positively to the 
R and D output of the firm, and because with increasing size the 
economic and/or medical significance of new single chemical.entities is 
~greater. The alternative hypothesis would be to reject the.null 
hypothesis. 
The appropriate criterion to test this hypothes~s is the F-ratio 
2 .~ 
test on the R of equation 5.32. Because this.test indicates 
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significance of the R2 at the.99 percent confidence level, the.null 
' ' hypothesis is rejected. It is concluded that Hypothesis 4 cannot be 
rejected, and the significance of the regression coefficients is 
presented as supportive evidence. 
The. rejection of this hypothesis implies that as the size and scale 
of Rand D of the drug firm increase, this increases the firm's output 
of new single chemical entities which in turn increases its sales which 
in turn increases its profitability which finally allows the firm to 
increase its R and D inputs. Thus, the output of new single chemical 
entities is important in determining the level of R and D inputs of 
drug firms. 
It could be construed that the preceding results support the. 
Schumpeterian hypothe~is that large size and monopoly power are neces-
sary to achieve technological advancement. Due to the unique institu-
tional framework of the pharmaceutical industry, this would be a 
misleading conclusion. The industry is unique in its regulatory aspects 
which impose institutional.restrict~ons upon the industry. The 
Schumpeterian hypothesis does not necessarily incorporate any outside 
institutional factors so that applying this to the drug industry.is not 
really appropriate. The preceding results merely reflect the institu-
tional change that has· t'a'ken place within the dn,1.g industry and the 
impact this change has had on the R and D activity of the industry. 
The present .chapter has presented the empirical evidence dealing 
with the four hypotheses of the study. This evidence is based on an 
input-eutput model of research and development which has been estimated 
using multiple regression analysis. Empirical.evidence.is presented 
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which may suggest that the 1962 Drug Amendments have had such an impact. 
that they have caused the marginal productivity of R.and D personnel to 
be negative. Likewise this has forced the R and D elasticities of these 
outputs to be negative. To reflect the economies of scale of.Rand Din 
the drug industry fat the 1965-1970 period, empirical evidence is 
presented whic~ shows that the interaction between the size of the firm 
and its scale of R and.D now positively affects the.Rand D output of 
f drug "firms. Further. evidence is presented which indicates the type of 
scale economies that.can be expected since the passage of the amend~ 
ments, not only does the scale of R and D determine R and D output, but 
the.Rand D productivity of the drug firm is.instrumental in determining 
the scale of the R and D activity of the firm. This comes about because 
firms can use profits from previously developed new single.chemical. 
entities to expand their research and development effort. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The ethical pharmaceutical industry is of special economic.interest 
because it is beth highly progressive and it constitutes a major pa~t of 
the health care·industry in the United States. The present study uses 
an industrial organization framework to investigate a specific aspect of 
the institutional makeup of the industry and how a change in this makeup 
has affected the research and development activity of the industry. 
The tremendeus economic impact of the 1962 Drug Amendments has been 
identified in.previous.studies, and the present study attempts to 
elaborate on t~is impact as it affects the productivity and scale 
economies of drug research and development. To investigate this impact, 
the productivity and scale economy conditions of t~e industry prior to 
the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments are suIIUnarized. These condi-
tions are then used to make appropriate comparisons with a period suf-
ficiently after.the enact~ent of the amendments to allow the full 
,. 
effects of the.amendments to become evident. A multiple regression 
technique.is the major method of analysis for this study. 
Four hypotheses are offered to investigate the impact of the 1962 
Drug Amendments on the productivity and scale econo~ies. The multiple 
regression model that is used.is one in which the Rand D output of drug 
firms is determined by the scale of research inputs, the size of the 
firm, the interaction between the size of the firm and the scale of 
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research, and diversification. The model is found to be significant 
when the relevant output variable is the number of new single chemical 
entities firms intreduced during.the period 1965-1970. 
This multiple regression analysis is used to test the four, 
hypotheses of .. the study. The first hypothesis states that since the 
passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments, the marginal productivity of 
prefessional Rand D personnel has become.negative. This is expected 
because of the increased.testing, reporting and record keeping that are 
required by the amendments. This activity has diverted the effort of 
these persennel thus causing th,eir productivity to become.negative. The 
marginal praduc;:tivities and the output elasticities of R.and D personnel 
for three arbitrary class sizes of f::l.rms are computed, and th,ese 
measures indicate that the marginal productivity of R and D persannel 
has become.negative sine~ the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments. 
However• the marginal productivities and elastic:t'ties are. based on the 
output being measured as new single chemical entities and the.input as 
the number of professianal R and D personnel. These are somewhat 
limiting in that th.ey do not:totally account for the.research and 
development ac~ivity of drug firms. 
The second hypothesis deals with th~ econmnies of scale of drug 
research and development that may be apparent since the passage of the 
amendments. This hypothesis states that since the 1962 Drug Amendments, 
specifically during the 1965-1970 period, the interaction b~tween the 
size of the firm and its scale of R and D has become a positive 
influence on the R and D output of the firm which indicates that 
economies of scale are present. For this study economies of scale ·]\ 
125 
relate only to research and development, and it means that a 
proportionate increase in all R and D inputs results in a greater than 
proportionate increase.in Rand D output. 
Two primary pieces of evidence are used to test this hypothesis. 
I~· 
First, .it .is hypothesized that the sign of the interaction variable is 
4 . 
positive rather than t~e previously observed negative sign. The sign of 
this variable is positive and this indicates that as both the size of 
the firm an9 its scale of research increase together, larger firms may 
now experience R and D efficiencies not previously exverienced. This 
change in the sign of the interacticm variable may reflect the .fact. that. 
as size and Rand D increase there may be.increasing efficiencies that 
come frem using more R and D personnel--both professional and 'te.ch-
nical-~and efficiencies may be gained from such things as specialization 
ef labor, more and larger laboratory equipment, computer facilities, and 
other scale benefits that may arise. It would appear that many of these 
scale.factors are important in complying with the provisions of the 
'"'· 
amendments as laid out ¥n the 1963 New Drug Regulations. 
The second place of evidence relating to the scale economies issue 
is contained in Hypothesis 3 and it expresses the type of economies of 
scale that can be expected since the enactment of the 1%.2 'orug Amend-
ments. It is hypothesized that supporting personnel are now important 
contributors to the R and.D output of drug firms. This is tested by 
introducing an additional variable into the regression equations; this 
variable is the ratio of supporting to professional R and D personnel. 
A positive sign and the statistical significance of the regression 
coefficient are offered as supportive evidence for this hypothesis. 
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The last effect of the amendments .on drug R and D is depicted in 
the fourth qypothesis, and it gives an additional clue to the size 
~ 
advantages that may now be available. With the passage of the 1962 Drug 
Amendments, .not only do the R and D inputs determine the level of R and 
D output, but the reverse is also true. Rand D output is now an 
important determinant ~f. the scale of research activity of the drug 
firm. This hypothesis is tested by employing two basic lead-lag 
relationships. The first states that with a regression equation that 
has the output at the end of the period being determined by the inputs 
at the beginning of the period would indicate that the hypothesis is 
not supported, A regression equation that has the output at the 
beginning of the period being determined by the inputs at the end of the 
period would indicate the hypothesis can be supported. The first equa-
tion is not statistically significant whereas the second is which gives 
support to the hypothesis. 
In dealing with these four hypotheses it is concluded that the 1962 
Drug Amendments have had a significant impact on the research and 
development effort of the drug industry. This impact may be very 
important in making firm size and the scale of the research and develop-
ment facility more predominant in determining the R and D productivity 
r 
of the industry. 
This is principally a positive study. In presenting the supportive 
evidence on the four hypotbeses, this study suggests that the 1962 Drug 
Amendments have heightened the entry barriers of doing research and 
development in the ethical drug industry. This would explain why the 
development of new drugs has become increasingly concentrated in the 
larger drug firms since 1962.1 Also, the supporting of the fourth 
hypothesis gives direct evidence of the type of heightened entry 
barriers that m-ight prevail in the drug industry. 
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These conclusions do not necessarily imply that an effective degree 
of competition may not exist in the drug industry, but they do suggest 
the notion that when an institutional change is imposed on an industry, 
it must be recognized that.this change can significantly alter the 
structure of that industry. It appears that the 1962 Drug Amendments 
have altered the structure of the United States .ethical drug industry. 
1Jadlow, pp. 175~183. 
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APPENDIX 
In·Chapter IV th,e size of the pbarmaceutical firm was defined as 
the ethical drug sales for that firm, In these cases where there was 
.. , '·' ~-
a. parent carparate entity with cme. or rti0re subsidiary units, the tetal 
, 
pharmaceutical sales 0f tl;lat c0rporate enqty determined the size ef '.· 
each subsidiary unit. All ef the.ether variables were specifically 
identified with the individual subsidiary units. These definitiens 
determined the values of the ebservatians that were used in th,e 
regressien estimates in Chapter v. 
As ·an alternative, the size ef firm is redefined so that the sales 
ef the individual subsidiary units determine the firm size. All ether 
variables are measured relat~ve to the subsidiary unit. Regression 
estimat~s were cemputed based en this redefined mea~re 0f firm size. 
Table A-I summarizes the results ef these analyses. Equaticm A. l 
is the estimated relatienship that is presented in Chapter V where.firm 
size is defined as the ethical drug sales ef all the subsidiaries 0f the 
parent. Equatien A.2 is th,e estimated relationship Where the size ef 
the firm is measured as the ethical drug sales 0f the individual sub~ 
sidiary unit only. As shewn.there is no significant difference between 
the twe regression equati0ns. 
The regressien analyses that were performed in Chapter V and are 
exemplified in equation A.l of Table.A-I revealed that the residual 
asseciated with Central Pharmacal was relatively high. In order to 
evalua:;t:e the impact of this high residual, the regression estimates are 
. ', ~ 
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TABLE A-I 
ALTERNATIVE REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR 1965-1970 PERIOD 
Total sample--size defined as sales of tQtal corporate encity. (See Chapter V.) 
* 2 . Y2 = - .046 + .4496R1 - .503Rl** - .008S** + .017I** - .083D1** (4.349) (-2~237) (-2.210) (2.212) (1.884) 
Total sample--size defined as sales of.subsidiary units only. 
Y2 = - .016 + .477Rt - .569Rf** - .OllS** - .023I* + .085D1 (3.996) (-2.169) (-2.101) (2.663) (1.949) 
2 (!. = .89) 
2 (R = .90) 
High residual removed--size defined as sales of total corporate entity. 
Y2 = - .040 + .284R! - .140Ri* - .002S* + .0041* + .014D1 (12.825) (-2.901) (-2.631) (2.496) (l.509) 
High residual removed--size defined as sales of subsidiary units 
y = -2 .064 + .305Rf - .188Rf* - .003S* + .007I* + .016Dl** (12.438) (-3.438) (-2.820) (3.634') (1.725) 
*Indicates statistical significance at 99% confidence level. 
**Indicates statistical significance at 95% confidence level. 
2 (R = .99) 
only. 
2 (R = .99) 
(A.l) 
(A.2) 
.(A. 3) 
(A.4) 
Statistical significance for the regression coefficients is determined by one~tailed t-tests, 
and the significance of the R2 by the F-ratio. 
The t-values are in parentheses under the regression coefficients. 
..... 
w 
"--I 
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cemputed with the Central Pharmacal observation removed. Equation A.3 
is the regression estimate where this high residual observation has been 
removed and where the size of firm variable is designated as th~ pharma-
ceutical sales of the total corporate entity. Equation A.4 is the 
regression estimate in which the high residual observation.has been 
removed and the size of firm variable is designated as the sales ef .. the 
subsidiary unit only. 
The ~emeval af the high res.idual observation has the effect of 
reducing the magnitude of .the regression coefficients. Those cases in 
wh:i,.ch the ebservatien is removed alse has the effect ef'.raising the 
2 
values of the R 's. Even though there is improvement in the regression 
estimates when the high residual observation is removed, there is no 
apparent justification fer net including this observation. Thus, the 
analysis presented in Chapter V is based on equation A.l in Table A-I. 
As indicated in Chapters IV and V, the production functian .. 
associated with the output of new single chemical entities can be 
generally expressed as: 
2 Y a a + bR - cR , (A. 5) 
where the values of a,·b, and care derived from the estimates af the 
regression coefficients shown in equation A.l. Using equation A.5, it 
is possible to compute the marginal productivity ef professional R and B 
personnel, the output elasticity ef these inputs, and the critical value 
of their use. :.!(' The critical,value being the number of personnel where .~ 
the preductien function reaches a maximum, thus forming the boundary 
between Stages II and III ef production. 
The regression equations A.2 - A.4 found in Table A-I thus allow 
alternative computations of the marginal productivities, elasticities of 
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eutput, and critical values af .prafessfonal Rand I!> inputs. Table A ... II 
summarizes these camputatians,fer each ef the.regressian equatiens. 
Redef inin,g the size af f :I.rm dees nat alter these meas~res ta a 
significant degree. The·remaval Gf the.high residual abservatian d~es 
have some effect an these measures, and this effect is mast naticeable 
far small· firms where the,marginal praductivities are pesitive. Haw-
ever, as was .. the case in Chapter V, the values af the marginal 
preductivity af prafessianal R and D persannel is clese ta zere. 
The greatest effect af these alternative regressian estimates.is 
seen with the critical value camputatiens~ These reveal that, far 
small firms, the.actual average levels ef prefessienal Rand D personnel 
are well wit.bin the Stage II-Stage. III baundary when the alternative 
regression ei;it~tes.are used •. As was faund in Chapter V, medium and 
la,.:ge sized firms are aperating in Stage.III. It sh~uld be nated that 
t~ere is ne way af telling hew the actual average values af prefessianal 
R and n persannel far small firms relate ta Stage I af preductian. It · 
cauld very well be that these small f~rms are eperating in Stage I • 
. Figure 4 depicts the relatianships af th~ actl,lal average levels ef 
prefessienal Rand D persennel,te their critical values fer.each ef the 
alternative regressien estimates. Paint A is the actual average value 
ef R fer small firms when size is defined as the sales ef subsidiary, 
units anly. Paint Bis the critical value ef.R under this definitien. 
As indicated; the actual value is well belaw this critical va~ue. Paint 
C is the actual average level af R,far medium firms under this defini-
tion, and D is the camputed critical value. Paint E is the actual 
average value af R far large firms and F is the critical value. Fer 
TABLE A-II 
ALTERNATIVE MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY, ELASTICITY~ AND CRITICAL VALUE ESTIMATES 
Marginal· Preductivifies-. ---· Elasticities Critical Values 
~aR/()Y} ~aRtaY 0 R/Y} of R~ 
Selected Sample Large· Medium . Small Large Medium small Large Medium Small 
1. Total sam.ple--size -.096 -.079 -.00075 -5.689 -2.174 -.015 220.3 92.9 48.1 
defined as sales of 
total corporate 
entity. (See Chapter 
v.) 
2. Total sample--size -.059 -.118 -.012 -13.493 -17.865 -1.26 263.7 206.6 89.8 
defined as sales of 
subsidiary units 
only. 
3. High residu.al -.017 -.008 .015 -1.413 -.319 .333 254.7 143.7 103.0 
obslervation removed--
size defined' as sales 
of total corporate 
entity. 
4. High residual -.016 -.026 .011 -.020 -.039 .018 zn;·o 134.0 83.8 
observation removed--
size defined as sales 
of ·subsidiary units 
only. 
..... 
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medium and large firms the average values are well abeve the csmputed 
critical values. 
Paint G is the,actual average value ef R far small firms when th~ 
high residual observatian.is removed and when.size is defined as the 
sales of all subsidiary units combi~ed. Point H is the computed 
critical value for this definitien. Again, the actual average is below 
the critical value. Paint I is the actual average value for medium 
firms under this definition, and point J is tbe computed critical value. 
Point K.is the actual average for large firms, and L is the camputed 
value far these firms. 
Point A also represents the average value of R for small firms when 
the high residual observation is remeved and when size is defined as the 
sales of each of the subsidiary units. Paint M is the cemputed critical 
value for this regression estimate. As with the two previaus cases, the 
average value is less than the computed critical value. Point C is the 
average value of R for medium sized firms and N is the computed critical 
value. Eis the average for large firms and.€> represents the computed 
critical value. 
With the exceptian af the camputations assaciated with small.sized 
firms, the preceding results are essentially the same as these'presented 
in Chapter V. Far the,most,part.there is no difference.between the 
regressien equatians A. l and A. 2 in Table A-I. The cemputations of 
marginal praductivitie.s, elasticities, and crtti~al values asseciated 
with these twa regression estimates are alsa essentially the same• The 
regressicm equations with the high residual abservaticm. remaved de have 
the same impact en the results, but there is no apparent justificatian 
far remaving this observatian~ 
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